Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division by Arunachaleswaran, Eshwar Ram et al.
Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for
Fair Rent Division
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran∗ Siddharth Barman† Nidhi Rathi‡
Abstract
We study the problem of fair rent division that entails splitting the rent and allocating the rooms
of an apartment among roommates (agents) in a fair manner. In this setup, a distribution of the rent
and an accompanying allocation is said to be fair if it is envy free, i.e., under the imposed rents, no
agent has a strictly stronger preference for any other agent’s room. The cardinal preferences of the
agents are expressed via functions which specify the utilities of the agents for the rooms for every
possible room rent/price. While envy-free solutions are guaranteed to exist under reasonably general
utility functions, efficient algorithms for finding them were known only for quasilinear utilities. This
work addresses this notable gap and develops approximation algorithms for fair rent division with
minimal assumptions on the utility functions.
Specifically, we show that if the agents have continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-
linear utilities, then the fair rent-division problem admits a fully polynomial-time approximation
scheme (FPTAS). That is, we develop algorithms that find allocations and prices of the rooms such
that for each agent a the utility of the room assigned to it is within a factor of (1 + ε) of the utility
of the room most preferred by a. Here, ε > 0 is an approximation parameter, and the running time
of the algorithms is polynomial in 1/ε and the input size. In addition, we show that the methods
developed in this work provide efficient, truthful mechanisms for special cases of the rent-division
problem. Envy-free solutions correspond to equilibria of a two-sided matching market with mone-
tary transfers; hence, this work also provides efficient algorithms for finding approximate equilibria
in such markets. We complement the algorithmic results by proving that the fair rent division prob-
lem (under continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear utilities) lies in the intersection
of the complexity classes PPAD and PLS .
1 Introduction
Fair division addresses the fundamental problem of allocating goods among agents with equal enti-
tlements, but distinct preferences. Such resource-allocation settings have been studied over multiple
decades in economics, mathematics, and computer science; see, e.g., [BT96], [BCE+16] and [Mou16]. In
this line of work, a classic problem—with direct practical implications1—is to allocate rooms (indivisi-
ble goods) among agents while also assigning the rent (setting prices) in a fair manner.
The standard notion of fairness in this setting is envy-freeness (introduced in [Fol67] and studied in
[Var74] and [Str80]) which requires that, under the imposed rents, each agent prefers the room allocated
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1For example, the website Spliddit, http://www.spliddit.org/, has been used over thirty thousand times for fair rent
division (as of June 2018) [GMPZ17].
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to it over that of any other agent. The preferences of the agents are expressed via functions (one for
every agent-room pair) which specify the utilities of the agents for the rooms at every possible room
rent/price. Hence, for the rent division problem, we say that an assignment of the rooms and the rent
is envy free (i.e., fair), if the utility that each agent a derives from the room allocated to it (under the
imposed rents) is at least as high as a’s utility for any other room.
Prior work has established that envy-free rent divisions are guaranteed to exist under general, but
well-behaved, utility functions. In particular, Sun and Yang [SY01] have shown that if all the utility
functions in a rent-division instance are continuous, monotone decreasing, and bounded, then an envy-
free solution will necessarily exist. This result relies on a fixed-point argument–namely, the Knaster,
Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Lemma [KKM29]. Similar existence guarantees have been es-
tablished by Svensson [Sve83] and Alkan et al. [ADG91].2
The special case of quasilinear utilities has also received attention in the rent-division context; see, e.g.,
[Ara95], [ASU¨04], [GMPZ17], and [PVY18]. In this utility model each agent a has a base value for every
room r, and a’s utility for r at price pr is equal to the base value minus pr. For quasilinear utilities, the
work of Aragones [Ara95] provides a combinatorial proof of existence along with an efficient algorithm
for finding envy-free solutions.
It is relevant to note that while the existence result holds under fairly general utilities, efficient algo-
rithms were known only for the quasilinear case. This work addresses this notable gap and develops
approximation algorithms for fair rent division with essentially minimal assumptions on the utility
functions. In particular, our results hold as long as the utility functions are continuous, monotone de-
creasing, and piecewise linear. Note that, for discontinuous and unbounded functions the existence of
an envy-free solution cannot be guaranteed (see Appendix C for examples). Also, the assumption of
piecewise linearity ensures that the underlying utility functions can be explicitly provided as input.
Indeed, the utility functions considered in this work are not confined to be concave (or convex),
and can be used to heterogeneously expresses agents’ preferences at different price ranges, e.g., we
can model agents who have quasilinear utilities and a fixed budget by considering piecewise-linear
functions that experience a sharp drop when the price reaches the budget; Procaccia et al. [PVY18]
provide a specialized algorithm to address these budget constraints. By contrast, this setting can be
modeled as a special case of the utilities considered in this work.
The rent division problem can be stated abstractly in terms of dividing indivisible goods (the rooms)
along with money (the rents) among unit-demand agents (i.e., each agent wishes to acquire at most one
item). This perspective is adapted in the work of Svensson [Sve83], Alkan et. al. [ADG91], Sun and
Yang [SY01], and Aragones [Ara95], who also consider relevant variants of the rent-division problem,
such as characterizing optimal prices and truthful mechanisms. This paper addresses these variants and, in
particular, focuses on (i) finding an envy-free solution with nonnegative prices and nonnegative utilities
along with (ii) finding an envy-free solution which splits a given total rent.
This work shows that both of these problems admit a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
(FPTAS). Formally, the developed algorithms find allocations of the rooms and rents such that for each
agent a the utility of the room assigned to it is within a factor of (1 + ε) of the utility of the room most
preferred by a. Here, ε > 0 is an approximation parameter and the running time of the developed
algorithms is polynomial in 1/ε and the input size. Overall, we show that a natural, approximate ana-
logue of envy freeness can be achieved efficiently for the broad class of utilities mentioned above. The
following list summarizes our contributions.
2A key tool in the work of Alkan et al. [ADG91] is a perturbation lemma (Lemma 1), which is utilized in this work as well.
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Our Results and Techniques Throughout, we study the problem of fair rent division under continuous,
monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear utility functions. We will also conform to the standard
assumption that every agent’s utility for each room is nonnegative when the room rent is zero.
• We design an algorithm for finding an approximately envy-free solution in which the rents and
the utilities of the agents are nonnegative (Theorem 2). This approximation guarantee asserts that
for each agent a the utility of the room assigned to it is within a factor of (1 + ε) of the utility of
the room most preferred by a. The runtime of our approximation algorithm is polynomial in 1/ε
and the input size.
• We also develop an FPTAS for the problem of computing an envy-free solution in which the sum
of prices (room rents) is equal to a specified total rent (Theorem 3). In contrast to the previous
result, the solution obtained for this problem might impose negative prices, i.e., require transfers
among agents. Note that there exist rent-division instances in which every envy-free solution,
which splits the total rent, levies negative rents on some room.
Under this total-rent constraint, nonnegativity of utilities under fair solutions cannot be guaran-
teed either. To circumvent this issue a natural scaling assumption is adopted in prior work on
quasilinear utilities, see, e.g., [BK01]. We show that, even in our setting, if the given rent-division
instance satisfies this assumption, then we can find an approximately envy-free solution which
not only splits the given total rent, but also yields nonnegative utilities (Theorem 4).
The two results mentioned above are obtained by first considering structured instances in which
the constituent slopes of all the piecewise-linear utilities are integer powers of (1+ε). We develop
an algorithm that finds (exact) envy-free solutions of such instances in time that is polynomial in
1/ε and the input size (Theorem 1). We then show that any given rent-division instance I can be
rounded to obtain a structured instance I such that an envy-free solution of I is an approximately
envy-free solution of I (Lemma 9).
• Sun and Yang [SY03] proved a somewhat surprising result that every rent-division instance ad-
mits an optimal solution which is simultaneously envy free, efficient, and nonmanipulable. The opti-
mal solution is efficient in the sense that the utility profile it induces weakly Pareto dominates the
utility profile of any other envy-free solution with nonnegative rents; the optimal solution itself
imposes nonnegative rents. Here, nonmanipulability refers to the property that any algorithm
that select the optimal solution as its outcome is guaranteed to be dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC). We show that for structured instances optimal prices can be computed ef-
ficiently. Therefore, for such instances we obtain a DSIC mechanism for the fair rent-division
problem. Our result is based on a novel characterization of optimal solutions, which not only
provides an alternate proof of existence of such solutions, but also leads to an efficient algorithm.3
• The developed algorithm also provides an efficient method to find (exact) envy-free solutions
when the number of agents is fixed (Section 4.1). Note that in this special case the piecewise-linear
utilities can still be intricate. We additionally show that if in a given rent-division instance the
number of distinct slopes (across utility functions) is a fixed constant, then an envy-free solution
can be computed in polynomial time (Section 4.1).
3The result of Green and Laffont [GL79] rules out universal existence of DSIC mechanisms that are both Pareto efficient
and budget balanced (i.e., split a given total rent). Hence, in the DSIC result of Sun and Yang [SY03]—and its algorithmic
version obtained in this work—the sum of rents cannot be fixed a priori.
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• We complement the algorithmic results by proving that the total problem of finding an envy-free
solution of a rent-division instance (with continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear
utilities) is contained in the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed
graphs) as well as PLS (Polynomial Local Search); see Theorem 6. Though, prior work has es-
tablished the existence of fair solutions using a fixed-point argument—in particular, the KKM
Lemma [SY01]—the containment of the (exact) fair rent division in PPAD is not an immediate
consequence of this proof. This follows the fact that the computational version of the KKM lemma
would entail discretization of the solution space (as is required in the case of related problems such
as Sperner’s Lemma [Pap94] and Envy-Free Cake Cutting [DQS12]) and, hence, we would get an
approximate solution of the reduced problem. Therefore, in and of itself, such a reduction would
imply that approximating rent division is in PPAD—this result would not rule out the possibility
that the exact version is harder. We bypass this issue by establishing a reduction from fair rent
division to the problem of computing an exact Nash equilibrium in polymatrix games. Given that
finding a Nash equilibrium is such games is known to be PPAD-complete [DFP06], we get the
desired containment. This reduction might be of independent interest, since it provides an alter-
nate proof of existence of envy-free solutions using Nash’s theorem (specifically for polymatrix
games), rather than a more involved fixed-point argument.
Another conceptually interesting part of the complexity analysis is the containment of fair rent
division in the complexity class PLS. This containment relies on a potential argument which is
developed in this paper. Overall, these results render fair rent division as one of the few “natural”
problems that lie in PPAD ∩ PLS and for which a polynomial-time algorithm is not known.4
As mentioned previously, we develop an exact algorithm for finding envy-free solutions for prob-
lem instances in which the slopes of all the piecewise-linear utilities are integer powers of (1 + ε).
We also show that general rent-division instances can be rounded to such structured instances while
approximately maintaining envy freeness of solutions. This, overall, provides an FPTAS for fair rent
division.
Our exact algorithm for finding an envy-free solution (Algorithm 1) begins by employing a homo-
topy idea. Specifically, we pick a large threshold M and for each utility function v construct a surrogate
function v̂ such that v and v̂ have the same function value for all prices less than M . For prices greater
than M , we set v̂ to be quasilinear. Recall that an envy-free solution with a nonnegative price vector
can be computed efficiently if the utilities are quasilinear [Ara95]. Therefore, we can find a nonnegative
envy-free price vector p0 for the quasilinear ends of v̂s. Since a uniform, additive shift in prices main-
tains envy freeness under quasilinear utilities, we can add M to each component of p0 and ensure that
it provides an initial envy-free solution for the utilities v̂s.
The key part of the algorithm is to iteratively reduce the prices while maintaining envy freeness
under v̂s. We continue to perform such a price reduction till all the rents are less than M . At this point,
the solution is envy free with respect to both the constructed utilities v̂s and the given utilities vs. Alkan
et al. [ADG91] used a perturbation lemma (Lemma 1) to accomplish an arbitrarily small reduction in
prices. By contrast, our algorithm performs this update by solving linear programs.5
4Another problem with the same complexity status is Colorful Carathe´odory [MMSS17]. Showing that these problems are
complete for a semantic subclass of PPAD ∩ PLS remains an interesting open question.
5In and of itself, the perturbation lemma does not lead to a finite-time algorithm for finding fair solutions; Alkan [Alk89]
provides an instance wherein the perturbations do not converge. Note that this lemma is not directly instantiated in our
algorithms, however it is used to prove the correctness of the developed methods.
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Our results rely on establishing interesting geometric properties of the set of prices that induce envy-
free solutions. Though this set is nonconvex, it consists of a sequence of polytopes which successively
intersect; see Figure 1. These intersections necessarily include the price vectors at which the sum of
prices is minimized in each polytope. At a high level, our algorithm obtains the price reduction by per-
forming a “walk” over these polytopes. Each step of the walk entails minimizing the sum of prices over
the current polytope (to reach an intersection point) and, subsequently, switching to a new polytope.
The minimization step corresponds to solving a linear program and the switching step is implemented
by solving a maximum-weight perfect matching problem (see Algorithm 1 for details).
Envy-free polytope for
σ1 = (1, 2, 3)
p3
p2
p1
Envy-free polytope for
Envy-free polytope for
σ2 = (2, 3, 1)
σ3 = (3, 1, 2)
Figure 1: The figure depicts (a) nonconvexity of the set of prices that induce envy-free solutions, (b)
chaining of polytopes, and (c) intersection of the polytopes contains the vertex that minimizes the sum
of prices. Numerical details of this example appear in Appendix D.
Another contribution of this work is to show that there exists a potential which decreases as the
walk though the polytopes progresses. This potential argument not only bounds the runtime of the
developed algorithm, but also enables us to show that the rent-division problem is contained in PLS.
It is relevant to note that the resulting algorithm is rather simple, even though the analysis is some-
what intricate—the algorithm primarily involves finding maximum-weight perfect matchings and solv-
ing linear programs. As mentioned previously, rent-division algorithms have been widely used in
practice. A notable example is the popular website Spliddit,6 the scale of which highlights that efficient
methods for fair rent division—like the ones developed in this work—have a potential for direct impact.
Further Related Work The work of Su [Su99] establishes the existence of envy-free solutions in an
ordinal version of rent-division problem. In this setup, each agent has a preference (over the rooms) for
6http://www.spliddit.org. See also https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/science/rent-division-
calculator.html, http://acritch.com/rent, and https://www.splitwise.com/calculators/rent.
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every possible division of the total rent. This existence result requires that the preferences constitute a
closed set and satisfy the assumption that each agent is miserly, i.e., prefers a free room (a room with
zero rent) to a non-free room. Note that in this setting the preferences can be nonmonotone and might
not admit a succinct, explicit representation.
This ordinal setup is incomparable with the cardinal utility model considered in this work; in partic-
ular, the miserly assumption does not hold for arbitrary quasilinear utilities. Furthermore, the ordinal
version of the rent-division problem is PPAD-complete.7 By comparison, we show that cardinal version
considered in this paper is contained in the complexity class PPAD ∩ PLS.
Competitive Equilibria of Two-Sided Matching Markets: Fair rent division is mathematically equiv-
alent to a two-sided matching market with monetary transfers. In this market formulation each agent
is assumed to be unit demand and each agent’s utility is a function of the indivisible good she re-
ceives as well as the amount of money she pays. Quinzii [Qui84] established the existence of com-
petitive equilibria under general (non-quasilinear) utilities in this market framework. Furthermore,
Demange and Gale [DG85] showed that equilibria in these markets admit a lattice structure. A con-
structive proof of existence of such equilibria was established by Alkan [Alk89]; in particular, Alkan’s
algorithm [Alk89] finds an equilibrium in finite time, though it does not admit a polynomial running
time bound. The quasilinear version of such two-sided matching markets has also been studied in prior
work [Gal60; SS71; Dem82].
An envy-free solution corresponds to an equilibria of such a market, since envy freeness implies
that each agent is maximizing its utility under the imposed prices. Therefore, this work also provides
novel results for efficiently finding approximate equilibria of such two-sided matching markets under
a broad class of utility functions.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Problem Instance A rent-division instance is a tuple 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A,r∈R 〉 wherein A = [n] denotes
the set of n agents andR = [n] denotes the set of n rooms. The cardinal preference of each agent a ∈ A
for every room r ∈ R is specified via a utility function va(r, ·); specifically, agent a’s utility for room r at
price (rent) pr ∈ R is va(r, pr) ∈ R.
Throughout, we will assume that the utility functions are continuous, monotone decreasing, and
piecewise linear. Each function va(r, ·) is given as an input via its constituent linear pieces. In particular,
va(r, ·) is specified using its base value va(r, 0), a set of increasing break points, b1 = 0, b2, b3, . . . , bt ∈ R+,
and the magnitude of the slopes {λar,i ∈ R+}i∈[t]. Here, the utility in the interval [bi, bi+1] is a linear
function with slope −λar,i. Therefore, if price x ∈ R+ is contained in, say, the ith interval, x ∈ [bi, bi+1],
then the agent’s utility for the room at x is
va(r, x) := va(r, 0)−
i−1∑
j=1
λar,j(bj+1 − bj) − λar,i(x− bi)
For ease of presentation, we will drop the dependency on i and use λar to denote λar,i when the
interval i is clear from context.
Rent division has been extensively studied for the special case of quasilinear utilities. Here, every
agent a has a base value va(r, 0) for each room r, and the utility functions are quasilinear in the prices,
7A reduction along the lines of the one given in Deng et al. [DQS12] establishes this hardness result.
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va(r, pr) := va(r, 0) − pr. An efficient algorithm for quasilinear utilities was developed in [Ara95]. Our
main algorithm solves the quasilinear case as a subroutine; for completeness, we outline a polynomial-
time algorithm for fair rent division under quasilinear utilities in Appendix A.
Allocations and Envy-Free Solutions An allocation refers to a bijection pi : A 7→ Rwhere room pi(a) ∈ R
is assigned to agent a ∈ A. Furthermore, a solution, (pi, p), to a rent-division instance is an allocation pi
along with a price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) for the n rooms. The utility that agent a achieves under the
solution (pi, p) is va(pi(a), ppi(a)). We will primarily consider solutions wherein the rents are nonnegative,
pr ≥ 0 for all r; exceptions to this convention will be explicitly mentioned.
Recall that envy freeness requires that each agent prefers its own “share” over that of any other
agent. Formally, for a rent division instance 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, a solution (pi, p) is said to be envy free
(EF) iff, under the imposed rents, every agent prefers the room assigned to it over any other room, i.e.,
for each a ∈ A and every room r ∈ R we have va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr).
A direct characterization of envy-free solutions is obtained by considering a bipartite graph F(p) :=
(A ∪ R, F ) where edge (a, r) is included in the edge set F iff r is a maximum utility room for agent a,
i.e., (a, r) ∈ F iff va(r, pr) ≥ va(r′, pr′) for all r′ ∈ R. Note that (pi, p) is an EF solution iff pi is a perfect
matching in F(p). We will refer to F(p) as the first-choice graph at price vector p ∈ Rn.
Another useful notion is that of a linear domain, which, for a given price vector p, specifies a containment-
wise maximal region which contains p and wherein the slopes of the utility functions do not change.
Definition 1 (Linear Domain). For a price vector p ∈ Rn, a linear domain (L,U) ∈ Rn × Rn is a maximal
region L < p ≤ U (i.e., Lr < pr ≤ Ur for all r) wherein for all agents a and rooms r the utility function va(r, ·)
has a constant slope (left derivative).
Note that breakpoints of any utility function lie on the boundary of linear domains, and never in
their interior. Since the inequality defining the lower bound L is strict, if for a room r the price pr is
equal to a break point, say bi, then we have Ur = bi and Lr < bi. Furthermore, the linear domain of a
given price vector p can be computed efficiently by finding, for each pr, the breakpoints (among all the
breakpoints of va(r, ·)s) that provide the best lower and upper bounds for pr.
Our algorithms work with a weighted version of the first-choice graph. In particular, for a price
vector p with first-choice graph F(p) and linear domain (L,U), we will use Fw(p) := (A ∪ R, F, w) to
denote a bipartite graph with the same edge set, F , as F(p) and edge weights w(a,r) := log λar for all
(a, r) ∈ F . Here, λar > 0 is the (fixed) slope magnitude of the utility function va(r, ·) in the linear domain
(L,U).
By definition, only the “first-choice edges” are present in Fw(p) and have weights associated with
them. These edge weights (i.e., the logarithm of the slopes) can be negative, since the slopes’ magni-
tudes λar > 0 are not necessarily greater than one.
Approximate Solutions This paper develops algorithms for efficiently computing solutions that are
approximately envy free, i.e., for finding solutions wherein for each agent a the utility of the room
assigned to it is multiplicatively close to the utility of the room most preferred by a.
Our algorithm starts with high room rents and iteratively decreases them till an approximately envy
free solution is found. Since the rents are high, agents’ utilities can be negative during the intermediate
steps of the algorithm. The following definition includes this case of negative utilities and thereby
provides a unified way to state the approximation guarantees.
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Definition 2 (Approximately Envy-Free Solutions). For a rent-division instance 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 and
parameter ε > 0, a solution (pi, p) is said to be ε-approximately envy free (ε-EF) iff
(i) For each agent a that attains nonnegative utility under the solution (i.e., va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ 0) the following
inequality holds for every room r ∈ R: (1 + ε)va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr).
(ii) For each agent a that attains negative utility under the solution (i.e., va(pi(a), ppi(a)) < 0) the following
inequality holds for every room r ∈ R: va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ (1 + ε)va(r, pr).
If the base values of the utility functions are positive, va(r, 0) > 0, then our algorithm will necessarily
find an approximate solution wherein the agents attain nonnegative utilities. Hence, in this standard
case, condition (i) of the above definition will hold for every agent under the computed solution, i.e.,
the solution found by the algorithm will satisfy the usual (1 + ε)-approximation guarantee.
Furthermore, for an ε-EF solution, (pi, p), it must be the case that if agent a’s utility for the assigned
room pi(a) is negative, then a’s utility for every room is negative at the price vector p.
2.1 The Perturbation Lemma of Alkan et al. [ADG91]
The following lemma of Alkan et al. [ADG91] asserts that starting with any fair solution one can always
find another envy-free solution with strictly lower prices for all the rooms. In this work we use this
lemma for proving the correctness of the developed algorithms although our algorithms do not directly
instantiate this result; in fact, in and of itself, the perturbation lemma does not lead to a finite-time
algorithm for finding fair solutions; Alkan [Alk89] provides an instance wherein the perturbations do
not converge.
In the following lemma the rents under the two solutions can be negative.
Lemma 1 (Perturbation Lemma [ADG91]). Let (pi, p) be an envy-free solution of a rent-division division
instance I. Then, for any small enough δ > 0, there exists another envy-free solution (σ, q) of I such that, for all
rooms r, we have pr − δ ≤ qr < pr.
Next we state a version of this lemma which identifies the allocations (bijections) which are realiz-
able in the perturbed solutions. This variant will be used in the analysis of our algorithms—a proof of
Lemma 2 is given in Appendix B for completeness.
Recall that Fw(p) denotes the weighted, first-choice graph at price vector p.
Lemma 2. Let (pi, p) be an envy-free solution of a rent-division instance I and σ be any maximum weight perfect
matching in Fw(p). Then, for any small enough δ > 0, there exists another envy-free solution (σ, q) of I such
that, for all rooms r, we have pr − δ ≤ qr < pr.
Here, σ is any maximum weight perfect matching in Fw(p).8 Since the edge weights can be negative,
σ is not necessarily a maximum weight matching in the bipartite graph.
2.2 Optimal Prices
For a rent division instance I, write E(I) to denote the set of nonnegative prices that induce an envy-free
solutions, E(I) := {p ∈ Rn+ | there exists pi s.t. (pi, p) is EF for I}.
The perturbation lemma implies that there are no isolated points in E(I). The work of Sun and
Yang [SY03] provides further insight into the geometry of this set by establishing that E(I), in fact,
8Given that (pi, p) is EF, Fw(p) admits a perfect matching (in particular, pi), hence σ is well defined.
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contains an optimal price vector p∗: specifically, Sun and Yang [SY03] show that there exists p∗ ∈ E(I)
such that the componentwise inequality p∗ ≤ p holds for all p ∈ E(I).
This, in particular, implies that the total rent imposed under p∗ is the lowest among all envy-free
solutions with nonnegative prices. One can also prove that (among all fair solutions with nonnega-
tive prices) the sum of agents’ utilities is maximized at the envy-free solution (pi∗, p∗); here, pi∗ is the
allocation associated with p∗.
Furthermore, Sun and Yang [SY03] established a notable property of optimal prices in the context of
strategic agents: an algorithm that selects (pi∗, p∗) as the outcome is guaranteed to be dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC).
In Section 7 we show that if all the slopes of a rent division instance are integer powers of (1 + ε),
for parameter ε > 0, then we can efficiently find the optimal price. Hence, for such instances not only
do we obtain an algorithm for finding EF solutions, but also an efficient, DSIC mechanism for fair rent
division.
3 Main Results
This section presents the statements of our main results.
Exact Algorithm for Structured Instances: We develop an exact algorithm for rent-division instances
in which the slopes of all the piecewise-linear utilities are integer powers of (1 + ε).
Theorem 1. For any given rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, wherein the utility functions satisfy
the powers-of-(1 + ε) property, Algorithm 1 computes an envy-free solution in time that is polynomial in 1/ε and
the input size.
Approximation Algorithms:
Theorem 2. For any given rent-division instance (in which the utility functions are continuous, monotone
decreasing, and piecewise linear) an ε-EF solution can be computed in time polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.
As mentioned previously, there exist rent-division instances wherein negative rents and negative
utilities cannot be avoided under any fair distribution of a given rent C. Specifically, in the following
theorem the computed solution might impose negative rents and utilities.
Theorem 3. Given a rent-division instance I along with a total rent C ∈ R, we can find—in time that is
polynomial in 1/ε and the input size—an allocation pi and a price vector p ∈ Rn such that (pi, p) is an ε-EF
solution of I and∑r pr = C.
The issue of negative utilities is circumvented in prior work (on quasilinear utilities) by adopting
the following assumption:
∑
r z
a
r ≥ C, here zar is the price at which the utility of agent a for room r
reduces to zero and C is the total rent. We prove that, even in case of piecewise-linear utilities, under
this assumption one can find approximately envy-free solutions with nonnegative utilities.
Theorem 4. Let I be a rent division instance wherein the inequality ∑r zar ≥ C holds for all agents a and
parameter C ∈ R. Then, we can find—in time that is polynomial in 1/ε and the input size—an allocation pi and
a price vector p ∈ Rn such that (i) (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution of I, (ii)∑r pr = C, and (iii) the utilities of all the
agents under (pi, p) are nonnegative.
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DSIC Mechanism for Structured Instances: We also design an algorithm for finding optimal solutions
of instances in which the slopes of all the utilities are integer powers of (1 + ε). Hence, using the result
of Sun and Yang [SY03], we obtain a DSIC mechanism for this setting.
Theorem 5. Given any rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, wherein the utility functions satisfy the
powers-of-(1 + ε) property, Algorithm 2 finds an optimal envy-free solution with runtime polynomial in 1/ε and
the input size.
Complexity of Fair Rent Division: EF-PIECEWISELINEAR refers to the total search problem of find-
ing an envy-free solution of any rent-division instance with continuous, monotone decreasing, and
piecewise-linear utilities. We show that
Theorem 6. EF-PIECEWISELINEAR is in PPAD ∩ PLS.
4 Exact Algorithm for Structured Instances
This section considers instances wherein the constituent slopes of all the utility functions are integer
powers of (1 + ε), for a fixed ε > 0. Specifically, in such instances, for all agents a, rooms r, and pieces
i, we have λar,i = (1 + ε)
k, for some integer k (which can be negative and depends on a, r, and i). In the
next section we will extend the analysis to general instances.
Write va(r, ·) to denote piecewise-linear utility functions wherein the slopes satisfy this powers-of-
(1 + ε) property, for a fixed ε > 0. We will show that, given a rent division instance 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉,
Algorithm 1 (ALG) finds an envy-free solution in time polynomial in 1/ε and the bit complexity of the
input.
Below we will prove that ALG can, in fact, find an envy-free solution for an arbitrary rent-division
instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉. It is the runtime analysis of the algorithm that requires the powers-of-
(1 + ε) property.
Given instance I, ALG begins by considering modified utility functions, v̂a(r, ·)s, that match va(r, ·)s
till a large threshold M and for prices higher than M the modified utility functions are quasilinear. In
particular, let M ∈ R+ be such that va(r,M) < va(r′, 0), for all agents a ∈ A and rooms r, r′ ∈ R. Since
the utility functions are monotone decreasing, such an M exists and can be computed efficiently.9
For all agents a and rooms r, define
v̂a(r, x) :=
{
va(r, x) for x ≤M
va(r,M)− (x−M) for x > M
(1)
Recall that envy-free solution for quasilinear utilities can be computed efficiently. Therefore, we
can find a fair solution (pi0, p0) for the quasilinear functions {va(r,M) − (x −M)}a,r . Furthermore, by
adding M to the (nonnegative) price of each room we can ensure that (pi0, p0) is not only envy free, but
also satisfies p0r ≥M for all r.
By construction, (pi0, p0) is EF for Î = 〈A,R, {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r〉. ALG starts with such a solution and
iteratively reduces the prices, while maintaining envy freeness with respect to v̂a(r, ·)s. The algorithm
terminates when it finds an envy-free solution (pi, p) wherein the rent for some room has been reduced
to zero. One can show that at this price vector p the rents of all the rooms have to be less thanM (details
9We can conservatively set M =
maxa,r va(r,0)−mina′,r′ va′ (r′,0)
mina,r,i λ
a
r,i
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Algorithm 1 ALG: Algorithm for fair rent division
Input: A rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 with continuous, monotone decreasing,
piecewise-linear utility functions
Output: An envy-free solution of I
1: For each agent a ∈ A and room r ∈ R, construct valuation v̂a(r, ·) as detailed in equation (1)
2: Compute an envy-free solution (pi0, p0) for Î := 〈A,R, {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r〉with p0 ≥M1
{Such a solution can be found efficiently using, say, the algorithm given in Appendix A}
3: Initialize i← 0 and let (L0, U0) ∈ Rn ×Rn be the linear domain containing p0
4: while pir > 0 for all rooms r ∈ R do
5: Update i← i+ 1
6: Set pii to be the maximum weight perfect matching in Fw(pi−1)
7: Set pi to be the optimal solution of the following linear program
min
x∈Rn
∑
r
xr (LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii))
subject to U i−1 ≥ x ≥ Li−1
v̂a(pi
i(a), xpii(a)) ≥ v̂a(r, xr) for all a ∈ A and r ∈ R
x ≥ 0
8: Set (Li, U i) to be the linear domain of pi
{The linear domain changes iff one of the inequalities in pi ≥ Li−1 becomes tight}
9: end while
10: Return (pii, pi)
of this argument appear in the proof of Theorem 1). Since all the components of p are less than M , at
this price vector the utilities under the functions {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r and {va(r, ·)}a,r are equal. Therefore, (pi, p)
is EF with respect to va(r, ·)s as well. Intuitively, this establishes the correctness of the algorithm. Below
we analyze the runtime of ALG and, overall, show that this algorithm efficiently finds an envy-free
solution.
The next few lemmas establish useful properties of the intermediate solutions, (pii, pi)s, computed
by the algorithm.
Lemma 3. Given a rent-division instance I, let Î denote the modified instance obtained in Step 2 of ALG and
(pii, pi) be the solution computed in the ith iteration of the algorithm. Then, (pii, pi) is an envy-free solution for
Î.
Proof. We will prove this claim by induction over i. ALG starts with a solution (pi0, p0) which is envy
free with respect to the quasilinear functions {va(r,M) − (x −M)}a,r and satisfies p0r ≥ M for all r.
For such high rents the utilities under v̂a(r, ·)s are equal to the ones under the quasilinear functions
{va(r,M)−(x−M)}a,r. Hence, for the base case, we have that (pi0, p0) is EF for Î = 〈A,R, {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r〉.
By the induction hypothesis, solution (pii−1, pi−1) is EF for Î. Therefore, pii−1 is a perfect matching
in the first-choice graph F(pi−1). This, in turn, implies that pii—which is set to be a maximum weight
perfect matching in Fw(pi−1)—is well defined.
The linear program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii)—which is solved in ALG to obtain pi—considers all the price
vectors (in the current linear domain (Li−1, U i−1)) under which pii is an envy-free allocation. Since this
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linear program is bounded and feasible,10 we get that it has an optimal solution, pi. Overall, these
observations imply that (pii, pi) is EF for Î, and the claim follows.
Given a price vector p, writew(pi) to denote the weight of the a matching pi in the weighted, bipartite
graphFw(p). Recall that for each edge (a, r) in this graph, the edge weightw(a,r) is equal to log λar , where
λar is the slope of the utility function v̂a(r, ·) in the linear domain containing p. Also, we have that the
slopes remain unchanged in a linear domain. Hence, if the linear domain of price vector p′ is the same
as the linear domain of p, then the weight of a matching pi in Fw(p′) is equal to its weight in Fw(p).
Whenever we will compare weights of matchings the linear domain will be fixed. Hence, for ease
of presentation, we will not explicitly denote the dependence of the weights, w(·), on the underlying
linear domain.
Lemma 4. Let (pii, pi) be a solution computed by ALG in an iteration i wherein the linear domain does not
change, (Li−1, U i−1) = (Li, U i). Then, the following strict inequality holds w(pii) < w(pii+1).
Here, pii+1 is the allocation computed by ALG in the (i + 1)th iteration, i.e., pii+1 is a maximum weight perfect
matching in Fw(pi).
Proof. ALG computes pi by solving the linear program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii) which, in particular, includes
constraints of the form x ≥ Li−1 and x ≥ 0. Note that if any one of these constraints is tight for pi, then
either the linear domain changes11 (i.e., (Li−1, U i−1) 6= (Li, U i)) or the while-loop terminates. Therefore,
pi must satisfy the following strict inequalities pi > Li−1 and pi > 0.
Lemma 3 ensures that (pii, pi) is EF and, hence, pii is a perfect matching in the bipartite graphFw(pi).
Using the fact that pii+1 is a maximum weight perfect matching in this graph, we get w(pii+1) ≥ w(pii).
Next we will prove that this inequality is never tight.
Assume, for contradiction, that w(pii) = w(pii+1), i.e., pii is also a maximum weight perfect matching
in Fw(pi). In this case, the perturbation lemma (Lemma 2) implies that, for any small enough δ > 0,
there exists a price vector q such that (pii, q) is envy free and pir − δ ≤ qr < pr for all r.
Since we have strict inequalities pi > Li−1 and pir > 0, an appropriate δ > 0 leads to a price
vector q which satisfies q ≥ Li−1 and q ≥ 0. In other words, q is a feasible solution of the linear
program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii), whose optimal solution is pi.12 The inequality
∑
r qr <
∑
r p
i
r contradicts
the optimality of pi and establishes the stated claim.
The following lemma shows that the room rents do not increase as the algorithm progresses.
Lemma 5. The price vectors, pi−1 and pi, computed in consecutive iterations of ALG satisfy the following
componentwise inequality: pi−1 ≥ pi.
Proof. The price vector pi−1 is a feasible solution of the linear program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii): by definition,
pi−1 is contained in the linear domain (Li−1, U i−1) and pii is a maximum weight perfect matching in
Fw(pi−1), i.e., (pii, pi−1) is EF.
We will show that the inequality p ≥ pi holds for all price vectors p ∈ Rn+ that are feasible with
respect to the linear program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii). Hence, the feasibility of pi−1 will gives us the desired
inequality pi−1 ≥ pi.
10The price vector pi−1, in particular, is a feasible solution of this linear program.
11Recall that the definition of a linear domain, (L,U), for a price vector p mandates a strict inequality between L and p, i.e.,
it requires L < p.
12Here, even if the inequality pir′ ≤ U i−1r′ is tight, for some r′, q remains feasible.
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Consider a feasible solution, p ∈ Rn+, of the linear program LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii). Say, for contradiction,
that there exists a room r such that pr < pir. We will show that the price vector, say q, obtained by taking
the componentwise minimum of pi and p is also a feasible solution. Note that such a q would satisfy∑
r qr <
∑
r p
i
r, which would contradict the fact that pi is an optimal solution of LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii).
Hence, it must be the case that p ≥ pi for all feasible price vectors p.
Write qr′ := min{pr′ , pir′} for all r′ ∈ R. This price vector directly satisfies the box constraints of the
linear program: Li−1 ≤ q ≤ U i−1 and q ≥ 0. To establish the feasibility of q it remains to show that q
maintains the envy freeness of pii, i.e., it satisfies v̂a(pii(a), qpii(a)) ≥ v̂a(r, qr) for all a and r.
For each room r, there are two possible cases either qr = pr or qr = pir. If qr = pr, then we have
v̂a(r, qr) = v̂a(r, pr) for all agents a. The feasibility of p ensures that v̂a(pii(a), ppii(a)) ≥ v̂a(r, pr). Since,
qpii(a) ≤ ppii(a), we get the desired inequality v̂a(pii(a), qpii(a)) ≥ v̂a(pii(a), ppii(a)) ≥ v̂a(r, pr) = v̂a(r, qr).
The inequality analogously holds for the case wherein qr = pir. This, overall, proves that q is feasible
and the lemma follows.
Using the lemmas mentioned above, we will now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. For any given rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, wherein the utility functions satisfy
the powers-of-(1 + ε) property, Algorithm 1 computes an envy-free solution in time that is polynomial in 1/ε and
the input size.
Proof. Consider a sequence of successive iterations S = {i, i + 1, i + 2, . . . , j} of ALG in which the
underlying linear domain remains the same, i.e., (Li−1, U i−1) = (Li, U i) = · · · = (Lj , U j). We will first
upper bound the length, |S|= (j + 1− i), of any such sequence.
Write λar to denote the (fixed) slope of the utility function v̂a(r, ·) in the linear domain (Li−1, U i−1).
Since all the slopes in the given piecewise-linear utilities are integer powers of (1 + ε), we have λar =
(1 + ε)k
a
r for an integer kar ∈ Z. The slopes, λars, are fixed throughout the linear domain and, hence, the
exponents, kar s, are fixed as well. Note that kar can be negative, but its magnitude is upper bounded in
terms of the bit complexity of λar : using |kar |= |lnλ
a
r |
ln(1+ε) and ln(1 + ε) ≥ ε− ε2/2, we obtain |kar |≤ 3|log λ
a
r |
ε ,
for ε < 1. Therefore, if β is the bit complexity of the input parameters, then |kar |≤ 3βε .
This magnitude bound implies that |maxa,r kar − mina,r kar |≤ 6βε . Furthermore, the edge weights,
w(a,r)s, in the bipartite graph Fw(pk), for any k ∈ S, satisfy w(a,r) = kar log(1 + ε). Therefore, the
difference in the weights of any two perfect matchings in the complete bipartite graph (A∪R,A×R)—
with edge weights set to w(a,r)s—is upper bounded by
6β
ε n log(1 + ε).
Since the linear domain remains unchanged throughout the sequence S, Lemma 4 implies the fol-
lowing strict inequalities w(pii) < w(pii+1) < . . . < w(pij+1); here pik is the matching computed by ALG
in the kth iteration, for k ∈ S. The above mentioned observation gives us
w(pij+1)− w(pii) ≤ 6β
ε
n log(1 + ε). (2)
Furthermore, for each k ∈ S, the weight w(pik) is an integer multiple of log(1 + ε); recall that each
exponent kar is an integer. Therefore, using the strict inequality w(pik) < w(pik+1), we get that w(pik+1)−
w(pik) ≥ log(1 + ε). This inequality and equation (2) bound the length of the sequence
|S|= j + 1− i ≤ 6βn
ε
(3)
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This bound implies that ALG changes the underlying linear domain after at most 6βnε successive
iterations. We will complete the runtime analysis of ALG by showing that the total number of linear-
domain changes in ALG is polynomially bounded.
Let `ar denote the total number of pieces in the piecewise-linear utility function v̂a(r, ·). Write ` :=∑
a,r `
a
r . Consider counters car ∈ Z+ and to keep track of the price changes we adopt the following
convention: after the ith iteration, with price vector pi in hand, the counter car is set to be the index
of the piece of v̂a(r, ·) which contains pir; in particular, if the price pir is between the tth and (t + 1)th
breakpoint of v̂a(r, ·), then at the ith iteration car = t. Since the initial price vector satisfies p0r ≥ M , for
all r, and M is the last breakpoint of all the utility functions v̂a(r, ·)s, we get that car is initialized to `ar for
each a and r. That is, at the beginning of the algorithm we have
∑
a,r c
a
r = `.
Lemma 5 ensures that the computed prices are nonincreasing. Hence, the counters cars are nonin-
creasing as well. Furthermore, in ALG, a change in the linear domain is triggered iff, for some r, the
inequality pir ≥ Li−1r becomes tight. By the definition of a linear domain we get that there exists an
agent a′ such that Li−1r is equal to a breakpoint of v̂a′(r, ·). Therefore, in ALG, whenever the linear do-
main changes the value of at least one counter, ca
′
r , gets decremented by one. As mentioned above,
the counter values do not increase as ALG progresses and initially they satisfy
∑
a,r c
a
r = `. Also, note
that ALG terminates as soon as the price of a room reduces to zero, hence the counter values satisfy
car ≥ 1 during the entire execution of the algorithm. These arguments prove that the total number of
domain changes is at most `. Using inequality (3) with this bound we get that ALG runs for at most 6βn`ε
iterations.13 This completes the runtime analysis of the algorithm.
To complete the proof we will show that the solution returned by ALG, say (pi, p), is EF for the
original instance I. This solution is EF for Î (Lemma 3) and the termination condition of the while-loop
ensures that pρ = 0 for some room ρ. Hence, p is componentwise less thanM : assume, for contradiction,
that pr′ > M for a room r′ and let α be the agent who is assigned this room, pi(α) = r′. The following
inequalities contradict the envy freeness of (pi, p) for Î
v̂α(pi(α), ppi(α)) < v̂α(pi(α),M) (utility v̂α(pi(α), ·) is monotone decreasing)
= vα(pi(α),M) (follows from (1))
< vα(ρ, 0) (by the definition of M )
= v̂α(ρ, 0) (again, follows from (1))
= v̂α(ρ, pρ).
Therefore, the returned price vector satisfies p ≤M1. Note that, when all the prices are less than M ,
the equality v̂a(r, pr) = va(r, pr) holds for all a and r (see equation (1)). Overall, we get that (pi, p) is an
envy-free solution of I as well, and this completes the proof.
4.1 Runtime Analysis for Special Cases
Theorem 1 establishes the time complexity of ALG (Algorithm 1) for rent-division instances in which
all the slopes are integer powers of (1 + ε). Specifically, this runtime analysis shows that the number of
iterations in ALG that consider the same linear domain (L,U) is at most the number of perfect matchings
with distinct weights in the first-choice graph associated with (L,U); see inequality (3). Write D to
13Since β is the bit complexity of the input parameters and ` is the total number of given pieces, the input size is O(β`n)
and, hence, an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in β, `, and n is deemed to be efficient.
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denote the maximum number of such perfect matchings. The powers-of-(1 + ε) property is used, in
particular, to show that for structured instancesD = O(βn ), which in turn shows that any linear domain
is considered in O(βn ) iterations; here, β is the bit complexity of the input.
For general instances, D continues to upper bound the number of iterations which consider the
same linear domain. However, without the powers-of-(1 + ε) property D can be as large as n!.
Next, we present two special cases of piecewise-linear utilities in which we can prove tighter bounds
on D and, hence, establish the efficiency of ALG.
Constant Number of Agents: Consider the case in which n is a fixed constant. This setting occurs nat-
urally in real-world applications wherein the number of roommates is small. Since D is at most n!, in
this case D is also a constant. Therefore, when the number of agents is fixed, ALG finds an envy-free
solution in polynomial time.
Constant Number of Distinct Slopes: For a rent-division instance, let k denote the total number of
distinct slope values across all the utility functions. Equivalently, k is the total number of distinct log-
arithmic values of the slopes. Note that the total number of pieces over all the utility functions can be
much larger than k.
For a fixed linear domain, consider the complete bipartite graph in which the edge weights are equal
to the logarithm of the slopes. Since there are no more than k distinct edge weights, say w1, w2, . . . , wk,
with each perfect matching µ in the complete bipartite graph we can associate a k-tuple (n1, n2, n3, ...., nk),
where ni represents the number of edges in µ whose weight equal to wi. Note that the weight of the
perfect matching µ is equal to
∑k
i=1 niwi, i.e., the tuple uniquely determines the weight of µ. Also, for
any matching
∑k
i=1 ni = n. In other words, the tuple is a k integer partition of n. Therefore, the number
of tuples is at most (n+ 1)k. This shows that D, the number of perfect matchings with distinct weights,
is also upper bounded by (n+ 1)k. Hence, if k is a fixed constant, then ALG finds an envy-free solution
in polynomial time.
This case (with k = 2) captures the setting in which the agents have quasilinear utilities and a
budget constraint (i.e., an agent cannot pay more than a specified amount as rent). A polynomial-time
algorithm for this setting was developed in [PVY18]. Since this budgeted setting can be modeled by
piecewise-linear utilities that have two distinct slope values (the slope of the quasilinear part, −1, and
a large negative slope at the budget of every agent), this work also obtains an efficient algorithm for
finding fair solutions under quasilinear utilities and budget constraints.
The analysis for the two special cases above also hold for the modified versions of Algorithm 1 that
are developed in Section 6 and Section 7.
5 Approximation Algorithm for Fair Rent Division
This section presents a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the fair rent-division
problem under continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear utilities. Given a rent-division
instance and an approximation factor ε, our first step is to construct a “close-by” structured instance in
which the slopes of all the utility functions are integer powers of (1 + ε). We will prove that any envy-
free solution of this constructed instance is an ε-EF solution for the original instance. Hence, using the
algorithm developed in Section 4 (ALG) we obtain an FPTAS.
Given a problem instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, we construct utility functions {va(r, ·)}a,r by
rounding the slopes of the functions {va(r, ·)}a,r piece by piece.
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Consider piece i of the utility function va(r, x) and let x1 and x2 be the breakpoints corresponding
to this piece (i.e., the piece is defined in the interval [x1, x2]). Write λar to denote the magnitude of the
slope of va(r, ·) in this piece. We will use Har and Bar to denote that value of the utility function va(r, ·)
at breakpoints x1 and x2, respectively: Har = va(r, x1) and Bar = va(r, x2). Since the construction is
identical for all pieces, we will overload the notation and not explicitly index these parameters by i;
each piece of va(r, ·) will be denoted by 〈[x1, x2], λar , Har , Bar 〉.
The following equalities hold for all x ∈ [x1, x2]
va(r, x) = H
a
r − λar (x− x1) = Bar + λar (x2 − x) (4)
Given a piece 〈[x1, x2], λar , Har , Bar 〉 and the approximation parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), we round up λar to
the nearest integer power of (1 + ε): define λar := (1 + ε)dlog(1+ε) λ
a
re and note that
λar
1 + ε
< λar ≤ λar (5)
To obtain the approximating function va(r, ·), each piece of va(r, x) is substituted by two linear pieces
with slopes λar and
λar
1+ε , respectively. Note that, by the intermediate value theorem, there always exists
an x∗ ∈ [x1, x2) such that Har = Bra + λar(x2 − x∗) + λ
a
r
1+ε(x
∗ − x1).
Utility
Pricex1 x2
Har
Bar
x∗
λar λ
a
r
λar
1+ε
va(r, ·)
va(r, ·)
Figure 2: Construction of va(r, ·) in a single piece.
Using x∗ (which can be found by solving the equation above), we define va(r, x) in the interval
[x1, x2] as follows (see Figure 2)
va(r, x) :=
{
Hra − λ
a
r
1+ε(x− x1) for x1 ≤ x < x∗
Bar + λ
a
r(x2 − x) for x∗ ≤ x ≤ x2
The piecewise-linear functions {va(r, ·)}a,r can be found in polynomial time by applying the above
mentioned procedure over the pieces of the given utilities {va(r, ·)}a,r.
For all agents a and rooms r, let zar be the price at which agent a’s utility for room r reduces to zero,
i.e., zar is the solution of va(r, zar ) = 0. While constructing each va(r, ·), we will treat zar as a breakpoint,
i.e., if zar is contained in the piece [x1, x2], then [x1, zar ] and [zar , x2] will be treated as distinct pieces during
the construction of va(r, ·). This convention ensures the following property
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Lemma 6. For all agents a ∈ A, rooms r ∈ R and any price x ∈ R, we have va(r, x) ≥ 0 iff va(r, x) ≥ 0. In
addition, for a price z ∈ R the equality va(r, z) = 0 holds iff va(r, z) = 0.
The construction of v directly implies the following properties (see Figure 2).
Lemma 7. For every agent a ∈ A, room r ∈ R, and each linear piece 〈[x1, x2], λar , Har , Bar 〉 of va(r, ·), the
following hold for all x ∈ [x1, x2]
(a) va(r, x) ≥ va(r, x)
(b) Bar + λar(x2 − x) ≥ va(r, x)
(c) Har − λ
a
r
1+ε(x− x1) ≥ va(r, x)
(d) va(r, x) ≥ 0 iff Har ≥ 0 and Bar ≥ 0
(e) va(r, x) ≤ 0 iff Har ≤ 0 and Bar ≤ 0
Note that at each breakpoint bi of the given utility function va(r, ·) we have va(r, bi) = va(r, bi). This
observation and the construction of {va(r, ·)}a,r (in each piece) imply that these functions are continuous
and monotone decreasing. Formally,
Lemma 8. The constructed utility functions {va(r, ·)}a,r are piecewise-linear, continuous, monotone decreasing
and in these functions every slope is an integer power of (1 + ε).
Using the above mentioned lemma we will now prove that the instance obtained by rounding the
slopes approximately preserves envy freeness.
Lemma 9 (Approximation Guarantee). Given an approximation parameter ε ∈ (0, 1) and a rent-division
instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 with continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear utility functions,
we can efficiently construct an instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 such that (i) the utility functions {va(r, ·)}a,r
are continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise linear, (ii) all the slopes in the utilities {va(r, ·)}a,r are integer
powers of (1 + ε), and (iii) any envy-free solution of I is an ε-EF solution of I.
Proof. To obtain I we construct the utility functions {va(r, ·)}a,r as mentioned above. Properties (i) and
(ii) in the theorem statement follow directly from Lemma 8. It remains to prove property (iii).
Let (pi, p) be an EF solution for I, i.e., for all agents a and all rooms r we have va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥
va(r, pr)
First, consider all agents a whose utilities are positive under the solution, i.e, consider a such that
va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ 0 and let the price ppi(a) be in the piece
〈
[x1, x2], λ
a
pi(a), H
a
pi(a), B
a
pi(a)
〉
of va(pi(a), ·). By
Lemma 6, we know that va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ 0. We have the following chain of inequalities
va(r, pr) ≤ va(r, pr) (Lemma 7 (a))
≤ va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
)
((pi, p) is EF for I)
≤ Bapi(a) + λ
a
pi(a)
(
x2 − ppi(a)
)
(Lemma 7 (b))
≤ Bapi(a) + (1 + ε) λapi(a)
(
x2 − ppi(a)
)
(using inequality (5))
≤ (1 + ε)
(
Bapi(a) + λ
a
pi(a)(x2 − ppi(a))
)
(Lemma 7 (d))
= (1 + ε) va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
)
(using equality (4))
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Therefore, if va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ 0, then (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution for the agent a.
The complimentary case addresses agents a for whom the utility is negative under the solution,i.e,
va(pi(a), ppi(a)) < 0. By Lemma 6, we know that va(pi(a), ppi(a)) < 0. Let ppi(a) be in the piece
〈
[x1, x2], λ
a
pi(a), H
a
pi(a), B
a
pi(a)
〉
of va(pi(a), ·)
va(r, pr) ≤ va(r, pr) (Lemma 7 (a))
≤ va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
)
((pi, p) is EF for I)
≤ Hapi(a) −
λ
a
pi(a)
1 + ε
(x− x1) (Lemma 7 (c))
≤ Hapi(a) −
λapi(a)
1 + ε
(x− x1) (using inequality (5))
≤ 1
1 + ε
(
Hapi(a) − λapi(a) (x− x1)
)
(Lemma 7 (e))
=
1
1 + ε
va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
)
(using equality (4))
Hence, for any agent a with va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
)
< 0, the inequality va
(
pi(a), ppi(a)
) ≥ (1 + ε)va (r, pr)
holds for all rooms r. Overall, we get that (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution for I.
Lemma 9 and Theorem 1 establish that the fair rent-division problem admits an FPTAS.
Theorem 2. For any given rent-division instance (in which the utility functions are continuous, monotone
decreasing, and piecewise linear) an ε-EF solution can be computed in time polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.
6 Fair Rent Division with Fixed Total Rent
This section considers the problem in which we are given a rent-division instance along with a total
rent (fixed cost) C, and the objective is to find an EF solution in which the sum of prices is equal to C.
We obtain an FPTAS for this problem by adapting ALG (the algorithm developed in Section 4).
In contrast to the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5, the solutions obtained in this section might
impose negative rents, i.e., require transfers among agents. In fact, for a general value of C, it might be
the case that envy freeness can be achieved only if one imposes negative rents on some rooms.14 The al-
gorithm developed in this section necessarily finds an approximately envy-free solution, but, efficiently
determining whether a given instance admits a fair solution in which the prices are nonnegative and
sum up to C remains an interesting open question.
Under this total-rent constraint, nonnegativity of utilities under fair solutions cannot be guaranteed
either, e.g., consider the case in which the utility of each of the n agents for every room r is nega-
tive, if the price of the room pr ≥ C/n. However, under a natural scaling assumption, instances with
quasilinear utilities are known to admit an EF solution in which the utilities are nonnegative [BK01].
Specifically, the assumption entails that for every agent a the sum of base values of all the the rooms is
at least C, i.e.,
∑
r va(r, 0) ≥ C. For quasilinear utilities, this translates to requiring that for every agent
a we have
∑
r z
a
r ≥ C, where zar is the price at which agent a’s utility for room r is equal zero. We will
14This case will arise if the total rent C is strictly less than the sum of rents at the optimal price vector p∗; see Section 2.2 for
the definition of p∗.
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prove that if an input instance (now with piecewise-linear utilities) satisfies this assumption, then the
solution computed by our algorithm endows nonnegative utilities to the agents.
Given a rent-division instance I (wherein the utility functions are continuous, monotone decreasing,
and piecewise linear) and a total rent C, first, we use Lemma 9 to construct another instance I. By
construction, in I the slopes of all the utility functions are integer powers of (1 + ε).
We detail a modification of ALG below, which finds an EF solution, (pi, p), wherein the sum of
prices is equal to C, i.e.,
∑
r pr = C. Since the utility function satisfy the powers-of-(1 + ε) property, the
modified algorithm finds such an EF solution for I in time polynomial in 1/ε and the input size. This
runtime analysis is analogous to one given in the proof of Theorem 1.
Furthermore, the approximation guarantee of Lemma 9 implies that (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution of the
given instance I. Hence, we obtain an FPTAS for computing a fair division of the total rent C.
Modifying ALG: To obtain an EF solution of I under the fixed-cost constraint, we will modify ALG as
follows
1. The threshold M (used in equation (1)) is set such that va(r, C) > va(r′,M) for all agents a and
rooms r, r′.
2. In ALG, the equality
∑
r p
i
r = C is used as the termination condition of the while-loop, instead of
pr = 0, for some rooms r.
3. In the linear programs LP(Li−1, U i−1, pii), replace the nonnegativity constraint (i.e., x ≥ 0) with∑
r xr ≥ C.
In the proof of the following theorem we will show that this version of ALG algorithm finds the
desired envy-free solution.15
Theorem 3. Given a rent-division instance I along with a total rent C ∈ R, we can find—in time that is
polynomial in 1/ε and the input size—an allocation pi and a price vector p ∈ Rn such that (pi, p) is an ε-EF
solution of I and∑r pr = C.
Proof. Using Lemma 9, we construct a rent division instance I such that all the slopes in this instance
are integral powers of (1 + ε). The modified version of Algorithm 1 described above is executed with
instance I as the input. Let Î denote the instance obtained in Step 2 of modified ALG and let M be the
threshold adapted for C.
Note that Lemma 3, Lemma 4, and Lemma 5 do not depend upon the nonnegativity constraint,
they rely only on the envy-freeness and linear-domain constraints. Therefore, these lemmas are also
application in the context of the modified algorithm. Also `, which denotes the total number of pieces
across all the utility functions, continues to upper bound the number of linear domains traversed by the
algorithm. Overall, the proof of correctness and runtime analysis of ALG directly hold for the modified
algorithm as well. Hence, the modified algorithm finds an EF solution, (pi, p), of the instance Î in time
that is polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.
Furthermore, the changes ensure that
∑
r pr = C. Note that there is at least one room ρ with pρ ≤ C,
which in turn implies that pr′ ≤M for all rooms r′: assume, for contradiction, that p′r > M and let room
r′ be assigned to, say, agent α, i.e. pi(α) = r′. With pρ ≤ C we have
15As mentioned previosuly, in Theorem 3 the computed solution might impose negative prices (i.e., entail transfers) and
lead to negative utilities for the agents.
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v̂α(pi(α), ppi(α)) < v̂α(pi(α),M) (utility v̂α(pi(α), ·) is monotone decreasing)
= vα(pi(α),M) (follows from (1))
< vα(ρ, C) (by the definition of M )
= v̂α(ρ, C) (follows from (1) and M ≥ C)
≤ v̂α(ρ, pρ) (utility v̂α(ρ, ·) is monotone decreasing)
This contradicts the fact that (pi, p) is an EF solution of Î.
When all the prices are less than M , the equality v̂a(r, pr) = va(r, pr) holds for all a and r. Thus,
(pi, p) is an envy-free solution for I and, invoking Lemma 9, we get that (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution of the
original instance I.
Recall that zar denotes the price at which agent a’s utility for room r is equal zero, i.e., zar satisfies
va(r, z
a
r ) = 0. We will complete the section by proving that nonnegative utilities can be ensured if∑
r z
a
r ≥ C for all agents a.
Theorem 4. Let I be a rent division instance wherein the inequality ∑r zar ≥ C holds for all agents a and
parameter C ∈ R. Then, we can find—in time that is polynomial in 1/ε and the input size—an allocation pi and
a price vector p ∈ Rn such that (i) (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution of I, (ii)∑r pr = C, and (iii) the utilities of all the
agents under (pi, p) are nonnegative.
Proof. Executing the modified version of Algorithm 1 (described above) we obtain an allocation pi and
a price vector p ∈ Rn such that (pi, p) is an ε-EF solution of I and∑r pr = C. Here, the correctness and
time complexity directly follow from Theorem 3.
Since
∑
r z
a
r ≥ C =
∑
r pr, for all agents a there exists a room r(a) such that pr(a) ≤ zar(a). If
va(pi(a), ppi(a)) < 0, then it must be the case that va(r, pr) < 0 for all rooms r; recall that (pi, p) is an ε-EF
solution of I (see Definition 2). However, this leads to a contradiction: va(r(a), pr(a)) ≥ va(r(a), zar(a)) =
0. Therefore, we have va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ 0 for all agents a, and this establishes the claim that the utilities
of all the agents are nonnegative.
7 DSIC Mechanism for Structured Instances
This section presents an algorithm for computing optimal prices (as defined in Section 2.2). In particular,
given any rent-division instance, I, the algorithm developed in this section (Algorithm 2) finds an envy-
free solution (pi∗, p∗) of I such that p∗ ∈ Rn+ and for all other EF solutions (pi, p) with nonnegative prices,
the following inequality holds: p∗ ≤ p.
We will, in particular, bound the runtime of Algorithm 2 for input instances wherein the slopes of
all the piecewise-linear utilities are integer powers of (1 + ε), with parameter ε > 0. The developed
algorithm finds the optimal price for any given instance, though we will show that if the utilities satisfy
the powers-of-(1 + ε) property, then an optimal price can be found in time polynomial in 1/ε and the
bit complexity of the input.
We will prove that an EF solution is not optimal iff there exists a subset of rooms whose rents can be
reduced while maintaining envy freeness and nonnegativity of prices. Algorithm 2 relies on this novel
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characterization of optimality and, in particular, efficiently identifies a subset of rooms (if one exists)
whose prices can be reduced further. The characterization ensures that the algorithm must have found
the optimal price, once no such subset exits. This method, in fact, provides an alternate, constructive
proof of existence of optimal prices.
As mentioned previously, for the rent-division problem with strategic agents, any algorithm that
computes the optimal solution (pi∗, p∗) is guaranteed to be dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC) [SY03]. Hence, for settings in which the utility functions satisfy the powers-of-(1 + ε) prop-
erty, Algorithm 2 provides a DSIC mechanism with runtime polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.16
We start by proving Lemma 10, which provides useful comparative results between EF solutions.
Next, in Lemma 11 we detail the above mentioned characterization of optimal prices.
The following notion of a tight set corresponds to the edges in the first-choice graph which are not
part of the current allocation. That is, for an envy-free solution (pi, p), the tight set contains agent-room
pairs, (a, r), where agent a is not allocated room r, but it derives maximum possible utility from the
room r as well.
Definition 3 (Tight set). Given an envy-free solution (pi, p) of a rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉,
define the tight set T(pi,p) := {(a, r) ∈ A×R | pi(a) 6= r and va(pi(a), ppi(a)) = va(r, pr)}.
σ(a) pσ(a) ≥ qσ(a)
pi(a) ppi(a) ≥ qpi(a)
σ(a)
a ppi(a) ≤ qpi(a)
pσ(a) ≤ qσ(a)
pi(a)a
Figure 3: Price comparisons between two envy-free solutions
r′
a ppi(a) ≤ qpi(a)
pr′ ≤ qr′
pi(a)
Tight edge
Figure 4: Price comparison for tight edges
Lemma 10. For any two envy-free solutions, (pi, p) and (σ, q), of a rent-division instance I, the following com-
parative results hold:
(a) If for an agent a ∈ A we have ppi(a) ≥ qpi(a), then pσ(a) ≥ qσ(a).
(b) If for an agent a ∈ A we have ppi(a) ≤ qpi(a), then pσ(a) ≤ qσ(a).
(c) If for an agent a ∈ A we have ppi(a) ≤ qpi(a) and (a, r′) ∈ T(pi,p), then pr′ ≤ qr′ .
Proof. We start by proving part (a) of the Lemma. Assume, for contradiction, pσ(a) < qσ(a), then follow-
ing chain of inequalities contradicts the envy-freeness of (σ, q).
va(σ(a), qσ(a)) < va(σ(a), pσ(a)) (by assumption and monotonicity of va(σ(a), ·))
16Extending this result to obtain an efficient, DSIC mechanism for general fair rent-division instances is an interesting
direction for future work.
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≤ va(pi(a), ppi(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi, p))
≤ va(pi(a), qpi(a)) (we are given that ppi(a) ≥ qpi(a))
For part (b), let agent a be contained in the orbit (cycle) O = [a0 = a, r0, a1, r1, . . . , ak−1, rk−1] ob-
tained by composing the matchings σ and pi. Here, the rooms and agents are indexed (modulo k) such
that, for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, we have ri = pi(ai) and ri = σ(a(i+1)).
Note that the given condition (ppi(a) ≤ qpi(a)) is equivalent to qr0 ≥ pr0 , i.e., for agent a1 we have
qσ(a1) ≥ pσ(a1). Applying part (a) with agent a1 and matching σ in hand we get qpi(a1) ≥ ppi(a1), i.e.,
qr1 ≥ pr1 . Since, σ(a2) = r1 we can inductively extend this argument to obtain qrk−1 ≥ prk−1 . That is,
qσ(a) ≥ pσ(a), which establishes the claim (see Figure 3 for part (a) and (b), respectively).
We complete the proof by establishing part (c) of the lemma. Note that room r′ satisfies va(pi(a), ppi(a)) =
va(r
′, pr′). Assume, for contradiction, that pr′ > qr′ . The inequalities below contradict the envy-freeness
of (σ, q) and, hence, complete the proof (see Figure 4).
va(σ(a), qσ(a)) ≤ va(σ(a), pσ(a)) (using part (b))
≤ va(pi(a), ppi(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi, p))
= va(r
′, pr′) (since (a, r′) ∈ T(pi,p))
< va(r
′, qr′) (by assumption)
The following constructs will be used in the computation of optimal prices.
Definition 4. Let (pi, p) be an envy-free solution of a given rent-division instance I. Define directed graph
W(pi,p) := (A ∪ R,←−pi ∪
−−−→T(pi,p)), i.e., the directed edge set of W(pi,p) is equal to {(r, a) ∈ R × A | pi(a) =
r} ∪ {(a′, r′) ∈ A×R | (a′, r′) ∈ T(pi,p)}.
Definition 5. Let I be a rent division instance with optimal price p∗. For any envy-free solution of I, say (pi, p),
with nonnegative prices, define the following sets:
• Ep := {r ∈ R | pr ≤ p∗r}.
• Ecp := R \ Ep
• Zp := {r | pr = 0}. Note that Zp ⊆ Ep.
Note that the optimality of p∗ ensures that all the inequalities in the definition of Ep are tight for any
nonnegative price vector p. In addition, a price vector p is optimal iff the set Ecp = ∅.
Since the definition of Ep directly refers to the optimal price vector, p∗ (which is not known a priori),
it is unclear if one can efficiently find this set for a given price vector p. By contrast, the subset Zp can
be directly computed. The following lemma shows that we can, in fact, efficiently find Ep, even if the
optimal price vector p∗ is not known.
Lemma 11 (Characterization of Ep). For any envy-free solution (pi, p) with nonnegative prices, a room r
belongs to the set Ep iff there exists a room z ∈ Zp such that r is reachable from z in the directed graphW(pi,p).
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for computing optimal envy-free prices
Input: A rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 with continuous, monotone decreasing,
piecewise-linear utility functions
Output: The optimal envy-free price of I
1: Set (pi, p) to be the output of ALG on I
{Note that in (pi, p) there exists at least one room r such that pr = 0}
2: Compute Ep and Ecp using the characterization given in Lemma 11
3: while Ecp 6= ∅ do
4: Set I ′ = 〈A′,R′, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, with A′ = pi−1(Ecp),R′ = Ecp
5: Run ALG on the sub-instance I ′ with initial solution set as the restriction of (pi, p) to I ′. Also,
modify ALG to include the following linear constraints in each LP instantiation
va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for all a ∈ pi−1(Ep) and r ∈ Ecp.
6: Ensure that ALG terminates if va(pi(a), ppi(a)) = va(r, pr) for any agent a ∈ pi−1(Ep) and room
r ∈ Ecp {We stop ALG if a new incoming tight edge is formed from an agent in pi−1(Ep) to a room
in Ecp}
7: Set (pi′, p′) to be the solution returned by ALG as executed in the previous two steps
8: Update pi and p as follows
pi =
{
pi(a) for a ∈ pi−1(Ep)
pi′(a) for a ∈ pi−1(Ecp)
p =
{
pr for r ∈ Ep
p′r for r ∈ Ecp
9: Update Ep and Ecp
10: end while
11: Return (pi, p)
Proof. For the given instance, write (pi∗, p∗) to denote an EF solution in which p∗ is the optimal price
vector.
If part: For room z ∈ Zp we have pz = p∗z . Therefore, a repeated application of Lemma 10 (c) (staring
with a = pi−1(z) and (σ, q) = (pi∗, p∗)) establishes the claim.
Only if part: Consider a room r which is not reachable from any z ∈ Zp. We will prove that in such a
case r /∈ Ep.
Write S(r) to denote the set of rooms that have a directed path to r inW(pi,p), i.e., S(r) := {r′ ∈ R |
r is reachable from r′ inW(pi,p)}. Note that, S(r) ∩ Zp = ∅, since r is not reachable from Zp. In other
words, pr′ > 0 for all r′ ∈ S(r). Also, let pi−1(S(r)) denote the set of agents that are allocated a room
from the set S(r), i.e., pi−1(S(r)) := {a ∈ A | pi(a) ∈ S(r)}.
The definition of S(r) ensures that there are no incoming tight edges in this set from an agent in
A \ pi−1(S(r)), i.e., there does not exist (a′, r′) ∈ T(pi,p) such that a′ ∈ A \ pi−1(S(r)) and r′ ∈ S(r): the
existence of such an (a′, r′) would imply that the room pi(a′) has a directed path to r (through r′) and,
hence, pi(a′) would have been included in S(r) and a′ in pi−1(S(r)).
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Therefore, for every room r′ ∈ S(r), we have (i) pr′ > 0 and (ii) there does not exist a tight edge
(a′, r′) ∈ T(pi,p) such that a′ /∈ pi−1(S(r)).
Now, consider the “sub-instance” I ′ :=
〈
A′,R′, {va(r, ·)}a∈A′,r∈R′
〉
, withA′ = pi−1(S(r)),R′ = S(r).
Note that (pi, p) restricted to I ′ is an envy-free solution for the sub-instance. Hence, we can apply the
perturbation lemma (Lemma 1) to strictly reduce the prices of all rooms in the set S(r), till either price
of a room becomes zero or an incoming tight edge to the set S(r) is formed. Overall, this implies that
the price of room r can be decreased while maintaining envy-freeness. Hence, it must be that case that
pr > p
∗
r , i.e., r /∈ Ep and the claim follows.
This lemma implies that, for any given envy-free solution (pi, p), we can efficiently find the sets Ep
and Ecp by, say, a breadth-first search traversal ofW(pi,p). We next state and prove the main result of this
section.
Theorem 5. Given any rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, wherein the utility functions satisfy the
powers-of-(1 + ε) property, Algorithm 2 finds an optimal envy-free solution with runtime polynomial in 1/ε and
the input size.
Proof. For analysis, write (pi, p) to denote the envy-free allocation at the beginning of an iteration of the
while-loop in Algorithm 2, and let Ep and Ecp be the partition of rooms induced by (pi, p). Using the set
Ecp, the algorithm constructs the sub-instance I ′ = 〈A′,R′, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 (recall that A′ = pi−1(Ecp) and
R′ = Ecp). Write (pi′, p′) to denote the envy-free solution computed for I ′. We will use (p˜i, p˜) to denote
the updated solution obtained at the end of this iteration
p˜i(a) =
{
pi(a) for a ∈ pi−1(Ep)
pi′(a) for a ∈ pi−1(Ecp)
p˜r =
{
pr for r ∈ Ep
p′r for r ∈ Ecp
Note that during the iteration, the prices of the rooms in Ep do not change, while the prices of the
rooms in Ecp decrease, i.e., p˜r = pr for all r ∈ Ep and p˜r < pr for all r ∈ Ecp.
The case analysis below shows that envy-freeness is maintained as an invariant, i.e., (p˜i, p˜) is an EF
solution of I.
Case I: Agent a ∈ pi−1(Ep) and room r ∈ Ep
va(r, p˜r) = va(r, pr) (since p˜r = pr)
≤ va(pi(a), ppi(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi, p))
= va(p˜i(a), p˜p˜i(a)) (since p˜i(a) = pi(a) and p˜p˜i(a) = ppi(a))
Case II: Agent a ∈ pi−1(Ep) and room r ∈ Ecp
va(r, p˜r) ≤ va(pi(a), ppi(a)) (constraints imposed in Step 5 of Algorithm 2)
= va(p˜i(a), p˜p˜i(a)) (since p˜i(a) = pi(a) and p˜p˜i(a) = ppi(a))
Case III: Agent a ∈ pi−1(Ecp) and room r ∈ Ep
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va(r, p˜r) = va(r, pr) (since p˜r = pr)
≤ va(pi(a), ppi(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi, p))
≤ va(pi(a), p′pi(a)) (since p′pi(a) < ppi(a))
≤ va(pi′(a), p′pi′(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi′, p′))
= va(p˜i(a), p˜p˜i(a)) (since p˜p˜i(a) = p
′
pi′(a) and p˜i(a) = pi
′(a))
Case IV: Agent a ∈ pi−1(Ecp) and room r ∈ Ecp
va(r, p˜r) = va(r, p
′
r) (since p˜r = p
′
r)
≤ va(pi′(a), p′pi′(a)) (by envy-freeness of (pi′, p′))
= va(p˜i(a), p˜p˜i(a)) (since p˜i(a) = pi
′(a) and p˜p˜i(a) = p′p˜i(a))
Therefore, va(p˜i(a), p˜p˜i(a)) ≥ va(r, p˜r) for all agents a ∈ A, and rooms r ∈ R. In other words, envy-
freeness is maintained throughout the execution the algorithm.
Note that in every iteration of Algorithm 2 either the rent of a room in Ecp reduces to zero or a new
tight edge is created, which, in turn, moves a room into the set Ep. Therefore, in every iteration, the
cardinality of the set Ecp decreases. Since the algorithm terminates when Ecp = ∅, the while-loop in the
algorithm executes at most n times. This observation and the time complexity of Algorithm 1 (which is
used as a subroutine in Algorithm 2) establishes the stated runtime bound.
Finally, using the fact that p is the optimal price vector iff Ecp = ∅ (Definition 5) we get that the price
vector returned by the algorithm is indeed optimal.
8 Complexity of Fair Rent Division
The section studies the complexity of finding EF solutions of rent-division instances with continu-
ous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise-linear utilities. Specifically, we show that this total prob-
lem EF-PIECEWISELINEAR (formally defined below) is contained in the intersection of the complexity
classes PPAD and PLS.
An instance of the the problem EF-PIECEWISELINEAR comprises of a tuple 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, where
A = [n] denotes the set of n agents, R = [n] denotes the set of n rooms, and va(r, ·) specifies the utility
of agent a for room r. Here, each function va(r, ·) is continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise
linear in the price. In particular, va(r, ·) is given using its base value va(r, 0), a set of increasing break
points, b1 = 0, b2, b3, . . . , bt ∈ R+, and the magnitude of the slopes {λar,i ∈ R+}i∈[t]. The objective of the
problem is to find an envy free solution (pi, p), i.e., a solution that satisfies va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for
all a ∈ A and r ∈ R.
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 6. EF-PIECEWISELINEAR is in PPAD ∩ PLS.
The proof of containment of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR in PPAD and PLS appears in Section 8.1 and
Section 8.2, respectively. To show that the problem belongs to the complexity class PPAD, we first
introduce a total problem EF-LINEAR, which entails finding EF solutions under linear utilities. Then,
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we reduce EF-LINEAR to the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game and complete
the proof by reducing EF-PIECEWISELINEAR to EF-LINEAR.
The PLS containment of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR is based on a potential argument which follows from
the analysis of Algorithm 1.
8.1 Proof of PPAD containment
The complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) consists of total search
problems that reduce to the canonical, complete problem ENDOFTHELINE. In ENDOFTHELINE, we are
implicitly given an exponential-size directed graph, which consists of paths and cycles, along with a
vertex that has no incoming edge. The objective is to find another vertex with degree one; the existence
of such a vertex follows from a parity argument.
We will first consider rent division with linear utilities and show that this total problem, EF-LINEAR,
reduces to the PPAD-complete problem of finding an exact Nash equilibrium in polymatrix games.
Furthermore, we will reduce EF-PIECEWISELINEAR to EF-LINEAR (Lemma 13). Hence, this chain of
reductions establishes the stated PPAD containment.
An instance of the total problem EF-LINEAR comprises of a tuple 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, whereA = [n]
denotes the set of n agents, R = [n] denotes the set of n rooms, and va(r, ·) specifies the utility of agent
a for room r. Here, each function va(r, ·) is linear and monotone decreasing in the price. In particular,
for all x ∈ R, we have va(r, x) := Har −λarx; where Har is the given base value and λar is the magnitude of
the slope. The objective of the problem is to find an envy free solution (pi, p) with a non-negative price
vector, i.e., a solution that satisfies va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for all a ∈ A and r ∈ R along with pr ≥ 0
for all r ∈ R.
8.1.1 Reduction
We prove that EF-LINEAR belongs to PPAD by reducing it to the problem of computing an exact Nash
equilibrium in polymatrix games. Given that equilibrium computation in such games is known to be
PPAD-complete [DFP06], we get that EF-LINEAR ∈ PPAD. Intuitively, we construct a polymatrix game
in which each agent plays a bimatrix game against a “landlord”. These bimatrix games are constructed
such that expected payoffs of the players correspond to utilities of the corresponding agents, under a
transformation from the mixed strategies to the prices. Furthermore, the mixed strategy of the landlord,
at an equilibrium, maps to an envy-free price vector. Hence, we obtain a reduction from rent division
to equilibrium computation.
A polymatrix game is a game where the interactions between the players are succinctly captured
by a graph. The players correspond to nodes of the graph and every edge (a, b) in the graph captures
a bimatrix game between agents a and b. Every player plays a single (mixed) strategy and her total
payoff is sum of the payoffs from all the bimatrix games she plays with her neighbors in the graph.
Given an EF-LINEAR instance L = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉, we will construct a polymatrix game G with
n+ 2 players and n+ 1 actions per player. Also, let M ∈ R+ be a large threshold such that for all agents
a ∈ [n] and for all rooms r, r′ ∈ [n], we have va(r,M) < va(r′, 0).
In the constructed game G players 1 to n correspond to the n agents A of the given EF-LINEAR
instance. As a gadget, we introduce player (n + 1) and room/action (n + 1). This additional player
and action will be crucial in establishing certain properties for Nash equilibria of the polymatrix game.
Player 0 in G represents the “landlord” and, at an equilibrium, the mixed strategy of this player maps
to an envy-free price vector.
26
The utility functions of the gadget agent (n+ 1) are defined as follows
vn+1(r, z) :=
{
γ − γ2M z for rooms r ∈ [n]
γ for room r = n+ 1
The utility of the extra room is set to be a constant for each agent a ∈ [n]; in particular, this utility
is defined in the following manner, va(n + 1, z) := maxr∈[n] va(r,M) + η, where η is a small positive
number such that maxr∈[n] va(r,M) + η < minr′∈[n] va(r′, 0). The definition of M ensures that such an η
exists. Note that all the utilities in this extended rent-division instance continue to be linear functions.
Write {0, 1, ..., n + 1} to denote the set of (n + 2) players in the polymatrix game G. Here, player 1
to player (n + 1) correspond to the (n + 1) agents of the extended rent division instance while player
0 corresponds to the landlord. The action set of every player in the game is the set of (n + 1) rooms,
denoted by [n+ 1].
The polymatrix game G consists of (n + 1) bimatrix games. Specifically, player 0 plays a bimatrix
game (P a, Qa) with every other player a ∈ {1, 2, ..., n+ 1}. Here, player a is the row player and player
0 is the column player with (n + 1) × (n + 1) payoff matrices P a and Qa, respectively. Since the utility
function for each agent a ∈ [n + 1] and each room r ∈ [n + 1] is a linear function of the form va(r, z) =
Har −λarz, we can construct payoff matrices wherein the expected payoff maps to the utility of the room.
Formally, define payoff matrix P a for every player a ∈ [n+ 1] as
P a(r,r′) :=
{
Har − λarM for r 6= r′
(Har − λarM) + 3nλarM for r = r′
For all players a in [n], the payoff matrix Qa of player 0 is set to be the negative identity matrix that
is, Qa := −I . The payoff matrix of player 0 for the game with player (n + 1) is set to be the following
diagonal matrix
Qn+1(r,r′) :=

0 for r 6= r′
−(n+ 1)2 for r = r′ 6= (n+ 1)
−1 for r = r′ = (n+ 1)
Write xa ∈ ∆n to be a mixed strategy of Player a over the action set of (n + 1) rooms. Hence,
(x0, x1, ..., xn+1) denotes a strategy profile for the above constructed polymatrix game. The construction
ensures that a mixed strategy x0 of the (column) player 0 induces a price vector p for the underlying
rent-division instance. In particular, the expected payoff, P ar (x0), of a row player a ∈ [n + 1] for an
action r ∈ [n+ 1], when the column player 0 plays mixed strategy x0 is P ar (x0) = va(r,M(1− 3nx0r)). In
other words, the expected payoff for action r ∈ [n+ 1] is equal to the utility at price pr := M(1− 3n x0r).
Note that if player 0 plays action r with zero probability, i.e., x0r = 0, then this is equivalent to setting
the price of the room pr to be equal to M . However, if player 0 plays action r with probability 1/3n,
then this leads to zero rent, pr = 0.
Write BRa(x0) to denote the best-response set of player a against strategy x0 of the column player,
BRa(x
0) := {r ∈ [n + 1] | P ar (x0) ≥ P ar′(x0) for all r′ ∈ [n + 1]}. Note that the expected payoffs
of player (n + 1) against the mixed strategy x0 ∈ ∆n of player 0 are as follows: Pn+1n+1 (x0) = γ and
Pn+1r (x
0) = γ2 +
3γn
2 x
0
r for r ∈ [n]. Therefore, we can identify the conditions under which an action
r ∈ [n] is a best response for player (n+ 1):
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
If x0r < 1/3n, then room r is not a best response for player (n+ 1)
If x0r = 1/3n, then player (n+ 1) is indifferent between room r and room (n+ 1)
If x0r > 1/3n, then room (n+ 1) is not a best response for player (n+ 1)
(6)
The expected payoff of player 0 for an action r ∈ [n + 1], when the remaining players play mixed
strategies (x1, x2, ..., xn+1), admits a closed form:
Qr(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) =
−
(∑
a∈[n] x
a
r + (n+ 1)
2xn+1r
)
for r ∈ [n]
−
(∑
a∈[n+1] x
a
r
)
for r = n+ 1
(7)
We can write the best response set of player 0 asBR0(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) = {r ∈ [n+1] | Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) ≥
Qr′(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) for all r′ ∈ [n+ 1]}
Recall that, under any Nash equilibrium, the support of the mixed strategy of any player is con-
tained in her best response set. Therefore, the following containments hold for any Nash equilibrium
(x0, x1, ..., xn+1) of the constructed polymatrix game, Supp(x0) ⊆ BR0(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) and Supp(xa) ⊆
BRa(x
0) for all a ∈ [n+ 1].
The key component of the reduction is the following lemma, the proof of which provides an efficient
method of converting a Nash equilibrium of the constructed polymatrix game to an envy-free solution
for the given rent-division instance.
Lemma 12. Given any Nash equilibrium (x0, x1, ..., xn+1) of the constructed polymatrix game G, we can effi-
ciently find an envy-free solution (pi, p) of the underlying EF-LINEAR instance L.
8.1.2 Proof of Lemma 12
We will first establish relevant properties that any Nash equilibrium of the game G must satisfy. Here,
the end goal is to show that an n × n matrix formed by stacking the equilibrium mixed strategies
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) as the rows is doubly stochastic. Therefore, the mixed strategies can be associated with
a permutation pi. Furthermore, the equilibrium mixed strategy x0 of the landlord (player 0) leads to a
price vector p for the n rooms. The following five claims establish these facts and will enable us to prove
that (pi, p) is an EF solution of the underlying rent division instance.
The first claim asserts that in any Nash equilibrium the (n + 1)th player selects room (n + 1) with
nonzero probability.
Claim 1. Under any Nash equilibrium (x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn) of the constructed game G, player (n + 1) plays the
action (n+ 1) with nonzero probability, xn+1n+1 > 0.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that xn+1n+1 = 0. Since x
n+1 ∈ ∆n, there exists an action ρ ∈ [n] such
that xn+1ρ ≥ 1/n. Note that, at any Nash equilibrium the support of the mixed strategy for a player is
contained in her best response set. Hence, action ρ ∈ BRn+1(x0). Conditions (6) ensure that this can
happen only if player 0 plays action ρ with a probability at least 1/3n, i.e., x0ρ ≥ 1/3n > 0. In addition,
the expected payoff of player 0 for the action ρ, under the equilibrium (x0, x1, ..., xn+1), is equal to
Qρ(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) = −(∑a∈[n] xaρ + (n+ 1)2xn+1ρ ) < −(1/n)(n+ 1)2 < −(n+ 1).
Independent of (x1, x2, . . . , xn+1), if column player 0 plays action (n + 1), then her expected payoff
will be at least −(n + 1); in particular, Qn+1(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) > −(n + 1). Hence, player 0 achieves a
strictly greater payoff from action (n + 1) than action ρ, i.e., ρ /∈ BR0(x1, x2, ..., xn+1). This contradicts
the fact that x0ρ > 0.
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The next claim shows that the equilibrium strategy of player 0 is always full support.
Claim 2. Under any Nash equilibrium (x0, x1, x2, . . . , xn) of the polymatrix game G, the mixed strategy of
player 0 is full support, i.e., x0r > 0 for all r ∈ [n+ 1].
Proof. We will prove this claim in two parts. First, we will show that player 0 places nonzero probability
mass on the (n+ 1)th action and then use this fact to show that x0r > 0 for all r.
Part 1: Assume, for contradiction, that x0n+1 = 0. Since, x
0 ∈ ∆n, there exists an action r ∈ [n] such that
x0r ≥ 1/n > 1/3n. Condition (6) then ensure that action (n+ 1) is not a best response for player (n+ 1),
that is xn+1n+1 = 0. This contradicts Claim 1. Hence, we must have x
0
n+1 > 0.
Part 2: Assume, for contradiction, that x0 is not full support. Hence, there exists a room ρ ∈ [n] such that
x0ρ = 0. This implies that the corresponding price of this room pρ = M(1− 3n x0ρ) = M and, hence, this
room is not a best response for any agent, i.e., ρ /∈ BRa(x0) for all a ∈ [n + 1]; recall that, for any agent
a ∈ [n] and mixed strategy x0, the expected payoff of action (n + 1) is equal to maxr∈[n] va(r,M) + η,
which is strictly greater than va(ρ,M).
In other words, x0ρ = 0 implies xaρ = 0 for all a ∈ [n+ 1]. This leads to player 0 receiving a payoff of
zero at action ρ, i.e., Qρ(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) = 0.
Claim 1 ensures that under any Nash equilibrium of the game we have xn+1n+1 > 0. This inequality
along with Equation (7) imply that player 0 receives a strictly negative payoff at action (n + 1), i.e.,
Qn+1(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) < 0. Part 1 of this claim has already established that player 0 plays action (n+ 1)
with a nonzero probability at any Nash equilibrium, i.e., action (n + 1) is a best response of player
0 under any Nash equilibrium. However, the inequality Qρ(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) > Qn+1(x1, x2, ..., xn+1)
contradicts this fact and, hence, establishes the claim.
Using the result that player 0 plays every action with nonzero probability, we will establish an upper
bound on player 0’s payoff for each room.
Claim 3. Under any Nash equilibrium (x0, x1, . . . , xn) of the game G and for every pair of actions r, r′ ∈ [n+ 1]
we have Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) = Qr′(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) ≤ −1.
Proof. Claim 2 implies that Supp(x0) = [n + 1]. Therefore, under a Nash equilibrium, every action is
a best response for player 0. In other words, this player achieves the same expected payoff from all
possible actions, Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) = Qr′(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) for all r, r′ ∈ [n+ 1].
Equation (7) gives us the following upper bound on the expected payoff of player 0 for each room
r ∈ [n + 1]: Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) ≤ −
∑
a∈[n+1] x
a
r . Adding up these inequalities across all the rooms we
get
∑
r∈[n+1]
Qr(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) ≤ −
 ∑
r∈[n+1]
∑
a∈[n+1]
xar
 = − (n+ 1) (8)
Since the sum of the expected payoffs of player 0 over all the (n + 1) rooms is bounded from above
by −(n + 1), we get that the expected payoff Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1), for any room r, is upper bounded by
−1.
Using this bound, we will now strengthen Claim 1 and show that at any equilibrium, player (n+ 1)
plays the action corresponding to the extra room (n+ 1) with probability 1.
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Claim 4. Under any Nash equilibrium (x0, x1, . . . , xn) of the polymatrix game we have xn+1n+1 = 1.
Proof. We know (by Claim 1) that xn+1n+1 > 0 and, hence, action (n + 1) is contained in Supp(x
n+1). Say,
for contradiction, that xn+1n+1 < 1. This implies that there exists another room r ∈ [n] ∩ Supp(xn+1).
Hence, player (n+ 1) gets the same payoff from the rooms r and (n+ 1). By construction of the payoff
matrices, this is possible only if x0r = 1/3n, which implies that the associated price pr of room r is equal
to 0. Now, comparing the expected payoffs for rooms (n + 1) and r for every other player a ∈ [n], we
get the following inequality va(r, 0) > va(n+ 1,M(1− 3n x0n+1)) = maxr∈[n] va(r,M) + η.
Therefore, room (n + 1) is not a best response for any player a ∈ [n], and we must have xan+1 = 0
for all a ∈ [n]. Note that in this case the expected payoff of player 0 for action (n + 1) is exactly equal
to −xn+1n+1 which, by assumption, is strictly greater than −1. This contradicts Claim 3 and, by way of
contradiction, the stated claim follows.
Note that the above claim implies that at any equilibrium, player (n + 1) plays the action corre-
sponding to any room r ∈ [n] with zero probability i.e. xn+1r = 0 for all rooms r ∈ [n]. The final claim
establishes that the probability mass on the remaining rooms r ∈ [n] is exactly equal to one.
Claim 5. Let (x0, x1, . . . , xn) be a Nash equilibrium of the game G. Then, for all rooms r ∈ [n], we have∑
a∈[n] x
a
r = 1.
Proof. We begin by proving that no player a ∈ [n] considers action (n + 1) as a best response to x0 at a
Nash equilibrium. Note that if a player a ∈ [n] plays action (n+ 1) with nonzero probability (xan+1 > 0),
then Qn+1(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) < −1; see Claim 4 and Equation (7).
Since player 0’s expected payoff is the same for every room (Claim 3), it must be the case that
Qr(x
1, x2, ..., xn+1) < −1 for all r. Adding up these inequalities we get ∑r∈[n+1]Qr(x1, x2, ..., xn+1) <
−(n+ 1).
However, summing up the expected payoff of player 0 across all actions (and substituting xn+1r = 0
for all r ∈ [n]), gives the following equality
∑
r∈[n+1]
Qr(x
1, x2, . . . , xn+1) = −
∑
r∈[n]
∑
a∈[n+1]
xar
− ∑
a∈[n+1]
xan+1 = −(n+ 1). (9)
This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it must be the case that xan+1 = 0 for all a ∈ [n]. These equalities,
Claim 4, and Equation (9) gives us
∑
a∈[n]
∑
r∈[n] x
a
r = n.
Finally, the equality of payoffs for player 0 (in particular, Qr(x1, . . . , xn+1) = Qr′(x1, . . . , xn+1) for
all r, r′ ∈ [n]) establishes the desired claim∑a∈[n] xar = 1.
Using these claims, we will now prove Lemma 12. Specifically, we will show that, given a Nash
equilibrium (x0, x1, . . . , xn) of the game, one can efficiently find an allocation pi for players 1 to n (i.e.,
for the n agents of the underlying rent-division instance) and a price vector p ∈ Rn+ (from the mixed
strategy x0 of player 0) such that (pi, p) is an EF solution of rent-division instance L.
For each room r ∈ [n], set pr = M(1− 3n x0r). The resulting vector p ∈ Rn is the price vector. Let X
be the n × n matrix in which the n rows are equal to the vectors (mixed strategies) x1, x2, . . . , xn. For
all a ∈ [n] we have ∑r∈[n] xar = 1 as xa ∈ ∆n and xan+1 = 0. Furthermore, by Claim 5, we know that∑
a∈[n] x
a
r = 1 for all rooms r ∈ [n]. Therefore, X is a doubly stochastic matrix. Write pi to denote a
permutation in the support of the doubly stochastic matrix X .
Note that for each agent a ∈ [n] we have xapi(a) > 0. Hence, action/room pi(a) is a best response of
player a against mixed strategy x0 of player 0. The payoffs and the best-response property ensures that
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the following inequalities hold for all rooms r ∈ [n]: va(pi(a),M(1 − 3n x0pi(a))) ≥ va(r,M(1 − 3n x0r)).
The definition of the price vector p gives us envy freeness: va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for all a and r.
Note that in any Nash equilibrium of the constructed game, action (n + 1) is a best response of
player (n + 1) (Claim 4). Therefore, conditions Equation (6) ensure that for any room r ∈ [n] we have
x0r ≤ 1/3n, i.e., the price pr = M(1− 3n x0r) of any room r ∈ [n] is nonnegative.
This completes the proof that, given a Nash equilibrium of the polymatrix game G, an EF solution
(pi, p) of rent-division instance L can be computed efficiently.
8.1.3 Piecewise Linear to Linear
The following lemma provides a reduction from EF-PIECEWISELINEAR to EF-LINEAR. Given a rent-
division instance I of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR we construct an instance L of EF-LINEAR by considering
the linear part of the utility functions of I beyond the last breakpoint. We further show that an envy-free
solution of L can be efficiently modified to produce an envy-free solution for I.
Lemma 13. Any instance I of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR can be efficiently reduced to an instanceL of EF-LINEAR
such that, given an EF solution of L, we can find an EF solution of I in polynomial time.
Proof. Let I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 be an instance of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR. Write K ∈ R+ denote the
last breakpoint among all the utility functions {va(r, .)}a,r. That is, each utility function va(r, z) is linear
for prices z ≥ K with a fixed slope, say, λar .
We construct an instance L = 〈A,R, {v′a(r, ·)}a,r〉 of EF-LINEAR. Here, each utility function v′a(r, z)
is of the form v′a(r, z) := Har − λarz with base value Har = va(r,K) (i.e., the base value is equal to the
utility at price K).
Let (pi, p′) be an envy-free solution of L with p′r ≥ 0 for all rooms r ∈ R. Note that finding such a
solution is a PPAD problem. Construct a price vector p ∈ Rn by setting pr := p′r+K for all rooms r ∈ R.
We claim that (pi, p) is an envy-free solution of the given instance I. Note that the utility functions
{va(r, ·)}a,r of instance I satisfy
va(r, pr) = va(r,K + p
′
r)
= va(r,K)− λar p′r
= Har − λar p′r
= v′a(r, p
′
r)
Therefore, envy-freeness of (pi, p′) for the constructed instance L directly implies envy-freeness of (pi, p)
for the given instance I.
Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 establish the main result of this section:
Lemma 14. EF-PIECEWISELINEAR lies in the complexity class PPAD.
8.2 Proof of PLS Containment
The class PLS (Polynomial Local Search) was defined by Johnson et al. [JPY88] to capture the complexity
of finding local optima of optimization problems. Here, a generic instance I of an optimization problem
has a corresponding finite set of solutions S(I) and a potential c(s) associated with each solution s ∈
S(I). The objective is to find a solution that maximizes (or minimizes) this potential. In the local
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search version of the problem, each solution s ∈ S(I) additionally has a well-defined neighborhood
N(s) ∈ 2S(I) and the objective is to find a local optimum, i.e., a solution s ∈ S(I) such that no solution
in its neighborhood N(s) has a higher potential.
Definition 6 (PLS). Consider an optimization problem X , and for all input instances I of X let S(I) denote the
finite set of feasible solutions for this instance, N(s) be the neighborhood of a solution s ∈ S(I), and c(s) be the
potential of solution s. The desired output is a local optimum with respect to the potential function.
Specifically, X is a polynomial local search problem (i.e., X ∈ PLS) if all solutions are bounded in the size of
the input I and there exists polynomial-time algorithms A1, A2, and A3 such that:
(a) A1 tests whether the input I is a legitimate instance of X and if yes, outputs a solution sinitial ∈ S(I).
(b) A2 takes as input instance I and candidate solution s, tests if s ∈ S(I) and if yes, computes c(s).
(c) A3 takes as input instance I and candidate solution s, tests if s is a local optimum and if not, outputs
s′ ∈ N(s) such that c(s′) > c(s) (the inequality is reversed for the minimization version).
Each PLS problem comes with an associated local search algorithm that is implicitly described by
the three algorithms mentioned above. The first algorithm is used to find an initial solution to the
problem and the third algorithm is iteratively used to find a potential-improving neighbor until a local
optimum is reached.
Fair rent division does not directly qualify as a local search problem, since there is no apparent
potential and any EF allocation with an appropriate price vector is an acceptable solution. However,
considering the execution of Algorithm 1 on an instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r 〉 of fair rent division
we will identify a local search method.
Algorithm 1 constructs an instance Î = 〈A,R, {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r〉 from the given instance I. Specifically,
using Equation (1) and a sufficiently large M ∈ R+, in the algorithm the utility functions of instance
Î are set to be quasilinear beyond M . Recall that an EF solution of Î in which all the prices are less
than M is an EF solution of I, hence we will focus on the constructed instance Î for the rest of this
subsection and show that finding such a solution is a PLS problem. Specifically, we will develop a
potential to interpret the execution of Algorithm 1 on Î as a local search algorithm. Here, algorithm A1
(see Definition 6) can be directly implemented, since we can compute an initial EF solution of instance
Î in polynomial time for the quasilinear utilities beyond M .
The solution space of any PLS problem has to be finite. This rules out specifying EF solutions in
the standard form (pi, p), since the space of such solutions is continuous. However, an alternate way
to specify envy-free solutions is through a tuple (pi, L, U) where pi is an allocation of the rooms to the
agents and (L,U) is a linear domain of Î. For any linear domain (L,U), the components of the vectors
L and U are the breakpoints of the modified utility functions, hence the total number of linear domains
of instance Î is always finite–specifically, it is O((`+ n)2n), where n is the number of agents and ` is the
total number of breakpoints of the given instance I. Let E(pi, L, U) be a set of vectors x ∈ Rn that satisfy
the following linear constraints: (i) L ≤ x ≤ U , (ii) v̂a(pi(a), xpi(a)) ≥ v̂a(r, xr) for all a and r, (iii) x ≥ 0.
Since (L,U) is a linear domain, for all price vectors x in (L,U) the utility functions {v̂a(r, x)}a,r are
linear in x. Hence, E(pi, L, U) is a polytope. The tuple (pi, L, U) is accepted as a valid solution of the
local search problem if the polytope E(pi, L, U) is nonempty, a property that is verifiable in polynomial
time. Note that every price vector p ∈ E(pi, L, U) can be paired with the allocation pi to generate an
EF solution of Î. In particular, we are interested in the price vector p(pi, L, U) that is defined to be the
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solution to the following linear program:
min
x∈Rn
∑
r
xr subject to x ∈ E(pi, L, U)
Note that it is not necessary that (L,U) is the linear domain of price vector p(pi, L, U). Recall that
(L,U) is the linear domain of price vector p if and only if for all rooms r we have Lr < pr ≤ Ur. There-
fore, if there exists a room r such that pr(pi, L, U) = Lr (which is not ruled out by the LP constraints),
then (L,U) is not the linear domain of price vector p(pi, L, U).
We define two potential functions, one for the allocations within a linear domain and the other for
the linear domains themselves, and then combine these functions in an appropriate manner to generate
the potential for the fair rent division problem.
Potential Function for Linear Domains: The proof of Theorem 1 employs a counting argument over
the linear pieces of the utility functions {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r to track the progress of Algorithm 1. The same idea
is used to define a potential function over the linear domains.
To begin with, we rewrite each linear domain (L,U) as an n-tuple of integers. For each a and
r, let qar ∈ Z denote the number of linear pieces (i.e., the number of breakpoints minus one) of the
function v̂a(r, ·) between 0 and Lr. For each room r, write qr to denote the quantity
∑
a q
a
r . Note that
each component Lr of the lower bound is a breakpoint of one of the functions {va(r, ·)}a∈A. Hence,
considering all such breakpoints in a sorted order, we can use the integer qr to uniquely identify Lr
from the sorted list of breakpoints. In addition, observe that a linear domain can be uniquely identified
using only its lower boundL. This follows from the the maximal property of linear domains; each upper
bound Ur is the first breakpoint that appears after Lr among all the functions {va(r, ·)}a∈A. Thus, each
linear domain (L,U) can be equivalently represented by an n-tuple of integers (q1, q2, . . . , qn). Let `ar
represent the total number of linear pieces of the piecewise-linear function v̂a(r, ·) and write `r :=
∑
a `
a
r .
Using these constructs we define the potential function for linear domains as φ1(L,U) :=
∑
r(`r − qr).
This potential increases as the lower bounds of the linear domains move closer to 0. Another rele-
vant property of φ1 is that its value is always an integer and any increase in φ1 is at least 1.
Potential Function for Allocations: Consider a tuple (pi, L, U) and let w(pi) denote the weight of the
matching pi in the complete bipartite graph between agents and rooms where the weight of edge (a, r)
is the logarithm of the slope of the function v̂a(r, ·) in the linear domain (L,U). Let Λ+ and Λ− be the
smallest and largest slopes across all the piecewise linear utility functions {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r. This leads to the
following inequalities: n log (Λ−) ≤ w(pi) ≤ n log (Λ+).
Now, we define the potential functions for the allocations:
φ2(pi, L, U) :=
w(pi)− n log(Λ−)
n log(Λ+)− n log(Λ−) + 1
The normalization ensures that for all inputs (pi, L, U), the potential satisfies φ2(pi, L, U) ∈ [0, 1). This
property ensures that any improvement in the first potential strictly makes up for any loss in the second
potential. Also, note that this potential is strictly increasing as a function of w(pi). Hence, Lemma 4
implies that potential φ2 can be used to track the progress of Algorithm 1 over consecutive allocations
within a linear domain.
These two potentials are combined to obtain the potential for the local search version of fair rent
33
division.
φ(pi, L, U) :=
{∑
r `r + 1 if pr(pi, L, U) = 0 for some r
φ1(L,U) + φ2(pi, L, U) otherwise
The solution (pi, L, U) whose associate envy-free price vector p(pi, L, U) has a zero component is ac-
corded the maximum possible value of potential. This choice reflects the fact that a solution (pi, p(pi, L, U))
with a zero price component is not just only envy free for Î, but it is also envy free for I (a detailed expla-
nation of this fact appears in the proof of Theorem 1). Therefore, every optimal solution of the potential
φ encodes an EF solution of the rent-division instance I. We now prove that the problem of finding a
fair solution lies is PLS by providing for it a local search algorithm that operates on the potential φ.
Lemma 15. EF-PIECEWISELINEAR is in PLS.
Proof. Given instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r 〉 of EF-PIECEWISELINEAR, let Î = 〈A,R, {v̂a(r, ·)}a,r〉 be
the instance constructed using Equation (1) with a sufficiently large threshold M .
The set of candidate solutions S(Î) consists of all the tuples (pi, L, U) such that E(pi, L, U) is non-
empty. In this setup, the three algorithms detailed in Definition 6 can be implemented efficiently. For
algorithm A1, using the fact that the utility functions are quasilinear above M , an initial solution can
be efficiently computed by using the algorithm of Aragones [Ara95]. We can implement algorithm
A2 efficiently as well, since one can verify whether a proposed solution (pi, L, U) is contained in S(Î)
in polynomial time; this step entails solving a linear program. In addition, the potential function φ
described above can be efficiently computed for every input (pi, L, U).
There are two cases to consider for the neighborhood algorithm A3. In the first case, there exists
room r such that pr(pi, L, U) = 0. Since the potential of such an input is the maximum possible value,
this input is declared as a local optimum. The second complementary case splits into two subcases.
Subcase 1: (L,U) is the linear domain of price vector p(pi, L, U). In this case the algorithm A3 outputs a
solution/neighbor (σ, L, U), where σ is a maximum weight perfect matching in the graphFw(p(pi, L, U)).
Note that σ can be computed deterministically in polynomial time. The tuple (σ, L, U) is a legitimate
solution (i.e., (σ, L, U) ∈ S(Î)) since the polytope E(σ, L, U) is nonempty–the price vector p(pi, L, U), in
particular, belongs to it. Next will show that (σ, L, U) is a solution with larger potential: since (L,U) is
the linear domain of p(pi, L, U), one can invoke Lemma 4 to prove that w(σ) > w(pi). This implies that
φ2(σ, L, U) > φ2(pi, L, U). Therefore, φ(σ, L, U) > φ(pi, L, U). Overall, for solutions p(pi, L, U) satisfying
this case algorithm A3 finds a neighbor with a higher potential.
Subcase 2: (L,U) is not the linear domain of price vector p(pi, L, U). Write (L′, U ′) to denote the linear
domain p(pi, L, U). Here, the neighbor computed by algorithm A3 is (pi, L′, U ′). This is a valid solution
(i.e., (pi, L′, U ′) ∈ S(Î)), since price vector p(pi, L, U) belongs to the polytope E(pi, L′, U ′), making the
polytope nonempty.
The potential φ increases at this neighboring solution. Specifically, let the n-tuples (q1, q2, ..., qn) and
(q′1, q′2, ..., q′n) represent the linear domains (L,U) and (L′, U ′), respectively. Since L ≤ p(pi, L, U) ≤ U ,
we have L′i ≤ Li and, hence, q′i ≤ qi for all i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, for p(pi, L, U) to not be contained in the
linear domain (L,U), there exists at least one room r such that pr(pi, L, U) = Lr implying that L′r < Lr,
i.e., q′r = qr−1. Therefore, comparing the tuples representing the linear domains (L,U) and (L′, U ′), we
get
∑
r q
′
r + 1 ≤
∑
r qr. This gives us the following inequality between the potential values of the linear
domains φ1(L′, U ′) ≥ φ1(L,U) + 1.
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With a change in linear domains, the associated slopes (and the weight w of the allocation) of the
utilities change as well. However, we know that the value of the potential φ2 (which depends on w) is
always within [0, 1). Hence, we have φ2(pi, L′, U ′) > φ2(pi, L, U)− 1. The above mentioned inequalities
give us the desired increase in potential φ(pi, L′, U ′) > φ(pi, L, U).
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A Rent Division with Quasilinear Utilities
The work of Aragones [Ara95] provides a characterization of the allocations that constitute envy-free
solutions under quasilinear utilities and, using this characterization, develops an efficient algorithm for
finding fair solutions for the quasilinear setting. For completeness, this section details this characteri-
zation and presents a polynomial-time algorithm for finding envy-free solutions in this setting.
Consider an instance Q = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A,r∈R 〉 wherein |A|= |R|= n and each utility function
va(r, ·) is quasilinear, i.e., is of the form va(r, x) = Bar − x. Here, Bar is agent a’s base value for the room
r. In other words, agent a’s utility for room r is the base value Bar minus the price/rent of room r. In
addition, write G(Q) = (A∪R,A×R) to denote the complete bipartite graph (between the agents and
the rooms) in which the weight of each edge (a, r) is equal to Bar .
The following lemma asserts that allocations that constitute envy-free solutions of Q correspond to
maximum weight perfect matchings in G(Q).
Lemma 16. For any rent-division instance Q = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉 with quasilinear utilities (i.e., va(r, x) =
Bar − x for all a and r), an allocation pi can be coupled with a price vector to realize an envy-free solution of Q if
and only if pi is a maximum weight perfect matching in the weighted graph G(Q).
Proof. Since quasilinear utilities are a special case of piecewise-linear utilities, the existence results men-
tioned previously ensure thatQ admits an EF solution. In fact, linear-programming duality can be used
to provide a stand-alone proof of existence for the quasilinear setting. We will assume the existence of
fair solutions in this setting and first show that if (pi, p) is an envy-free solution, then for any maximum
weight perfect matching, σ, the solution (σ, p) is also envy free.
If Part: Since (pi, p) is an EF solution, va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≥ va(σ(a), pσ(a)) for all agents a. Given that σ is
maximum weight perfect matching in G(Q), we have ∑aBapi(a) ≤ ∑aBaσ(a). Subtracting ∑r pr from
both sides gives us
∑
aB
a
pi(a) −
∑
r pr ≤
∑
aB
a
σ(a) −
∑
r pr. Regrouping the terms, we get
∑
a(B
a
pi(a) −
ppi(a)) ≤
∑
a(B
a
σ(a) − pσ(a)). That is,
∑
a va(pi(a), ppi(a)) ≤
∑
a va(σ(a), pσ(a)).
Hence, the termwise inequality (which follows from the envy freeness of (pi, p)) mentioned above
implies that va(pi(a), ppi(a)) = va(σ(a), pσ(a)) for all agents a. Therefore, (σ, p) is also an envy-free solu-
tion of the given instance Q.
Only if Part: Assume, for contradiction, that pi is not a maximum weight perfect matching, but (pi, p) is
an EF solution. Write pi∗ to denote a maximum weight perfect matching in G(Q). Therefore,∑
a
Bapi(a) <
∑
a
Bapi∗(a)∑
a
Bapi(a) −
∑
r
pr <
∑
a
Bapi∗(a) −
∑
r
pr (subtracting
∑
r
pr)∑
a
(Bapi(a) − ppi(a)) <
∑
a
(Bapi∗(a) − ppi∗(a))∑
a
va(pi(a), ppi(a)) <
∑
a
va(pi
∗(a), ppi∗(a))
Hence, there exists an agent a such that va(pi(a), ppi(a)) < va(pi∗(a), ppi∗(a)). This inequality contradicts
the envy freeness of (pi, p).
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A direct implication of Lemma 16 is that finding any maximum weight perfect matching of G(Q)
(which is a polynomial-time computation) gives us an allocation of an envy-free solution. Once the
allocation is fixed, for quasilinear utilities the envy-free requirements correspond to linear constraints.
Therefore, we can write a linear program to find envy-free prices.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compute an envy-free solution under quasilinear utilities
Input: A rent division instance with quasilinear utilities Q = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r 〉
Output: An envy-free solution (pi, p) for Q
1: Compute pi, a maximum weight perfect matching in G(Q)
2: Set p to be a solution of the following linear program
max
x∈Rn
0Tx
subject to x ≥ 0
va(pi(a), xpi(a)) ≥ va(r, xr) for all a ∈ A and r ∈ R
3: Return (pi, p)
Lemma 17. Given any rent division instance Q = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r 〉 with quasilinear utilities, Algorithm 3
computes an envy-free solution of Q in polynomial time.
Proof. The runtime analysis is direct. A maximum weight perfect matching can be computed in poly-
nomial time. Furthermore, the linear program can be solved in time polynomial in n, since it contains
n variables and O(n2) constraints.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from Lemma 16.
B Perturbation Lemma
As mentioned previously, this works uses a variant of the Perturbation Lemma of Alkan et al. [ADG91]
(Lemma 2). This section provides a proof of this variant for completeness.
We first consider rent-division instancesQ = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r 〉with quasilinear utilities, va(r, x) :=
Bar − x. Write G(Q) = (A ∪R,A×R) to denote the complete bipartite graph (between the agents and
the rooms) in which the weight of each edge (a, r) ∈ A×R is equal to Bar .
Recall that Lemma 16 shows that if pi is a maximum weight perfect matching in G(Q), then there
exists a price vector p ∈ Rn such that Bapi(a)−ppi(a) ≥ Bar −pr for all a and r (i.e., (pi, p) is an EF solution).
Next, we state and prove a multiplicative version of this lemma.
Lemma 18. Let H = ([n] ∪ [n], [n] × [n],W ) be a complete bipartite graph with nonnegative edge weights,
W(a,r) ≥ 0 for all a, r ∈ [n]. IfH admits a positive matching (i.e., there exists a matching pi such thatW(a,pi(a)) >
0 for all a ∈ [n]), then there exists a matching σ ofH and a positive vector d ∈ Rn+ such that
dσ(a)W(a,σ(a)) ≥ drW(a,r) for all a, r ∈ [n]
Proof. Construct a bipartite graph G = (A ∪R,A ×R) with A = R = [n] and edge weights {Bar }a,r as
follows
Bar :=
{
logW(a,r) if W(a,r) > 0 for (a, r) ∈ A×R
−∞ else if W(a,r) = 0
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Write σ to denote a maximum weight perfect matching in G. Since H contains a positive perfect
matching, the weight of σ is finite. In addition, Lemma 16 ensures that there exists p ∈ Rn such that
logW(a,σ(a)) − pσ(a) ≥ logW(a,r) − pr for all a, r ∈ [n].
Setting dr := exp(−pr) > 0 and taking exponentials, we get the stated result.
We are now ready to prove the variant of Perturbation Lemma which identifies the allocations (bi-
jections) which are realizable in the perturbed solutions.
Recall that F(p) denotes the first-choice graph under a given price vector p ∈ Rn, and Fw(p) denotes
the weighted version on this bipartite graph. Also, note that in the following lemma the utilities are not
confined to be quasilinear.
Lemma 2. Let (pi, p) be an envy-free solution of a rent-division instance I and σ be any maximum weight perfect
matching in Fw(p). Then, for any small enough δ > 0, there exists another envy-free solution (σ, q) of I such
that, for all rooms r, we have pr − δ ≤ qr < pr.
Proof. Let (L,U) denote the linear domain of the given price vector p and write F to denote the edge
set of the graph F(p), i.e., F := {(a, r) ∈ A×R | va(r, pr) = va(pi(a), ppi(a))}. Note that (a, pi(a)) belongs
to this set of first-choice edges F for all agents a ∈ A.
As before, we use w(a,r) to denote the edge weights of the graph Fw(p), i.e., w(a,r) := log λar , for all
(a, r) ∈ F . Here, λar > 0 is the (fixed) magnitude of the slope of the utility function va(r, ·) in the linear
domain (L,U).
Since the utility functions va(r, ·) are continuous, monotone decreasing, and piecewise linear, the
following equality holds for all a ∈ A, r ∈ R, and any vector d ∈ Rn+ with sufficiently small, positive
components
va(r, pr − dr) = va(r, pr) + λar dr
Define a complete bipartite graphH = (A∪R,A×R,W ) wherein the weight of each edge (a, r) ∈ F
is set to be W(a,r) = exp(w(a,r)) = λar > 0, and W(a,r) = 0 for all (a, r) ∈ (A×R)\F . The edge weights in
H are nonnegative and it contains a positive matching, in particular pi; specifically, only the first-choice
edges (i.e., the edges in F ) have positive weight inH.
Lemma 18 implies that there exists a matching σ and a positive vector d ∈ Rn+ such that
dσ(a) W(a,σ(a)) ≥ dr W(a,r) for all a and r. (10)
It is relevant to note that the graph G considered in the proof of Lemma 18 corresponds to Fw(p).
Hence, via the proof of Lemma 18, we get that σ is a maximum weight perfect matching in Fw(p).
Furthermore, for each agent a ∈ A, the edge (a, σ(a)) is a first-choice edges, i.e., (a, σ(a)) ∈ F :
assume, for contradiction, that (a, σ(a)) /∈ F , then the weight of this edge in H is zero, W(a,σ(a)) = 0.
Setting r = pi(a) and using (10), we get W(a,pi(a)) = 0. This contradicts that fact that (a, pi(a)) ∈ F , since
the weight (under W ) of every edge in F is positive.
Since (a, σ(a)) ∈ F for all a, we have
dσ(a) λ
a
σ(a) ≥ dr λar for all (a, r) ∈ F. (11)
Note that the components of the positive vector d can be multiplicatively scaled to obtain 0 < dr ≤ δ,
for any positive parameter δ > 0. A uniform scaling also ensures that inequality (11) continues to hold.
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Setting parameter δ > 0 to be small enough and price vector q := p − d, next we will complete the
proof by establishing that (σ, q) is an EF solution of the given instance.
For each agent a, we will consider two exhaustive cases (i) (a, r) ∈ F and (ii) (a, r) /∈ F . If (a, r) ∈ F
(i.e., (a, r) is a first choice edge), then
va(r, qr) = va(r, pr − dr) (by definition of q)
= va(r, pr) + drλ
a
r (by peicewise linearity of va(r, ·) and dr ≤ δ)
≤ va(r, pr) + dσ(a) λaσ(a) (by inequality (11))
= va(σ(a), pσ(a)) + dσ(a) λ
a
σ(a) (since (a, σ(a)), (a, r) ∈ F )
= va(σ(a), pσ(a) − dσ(a)) (by peicewise linearity of va(r, ·) and dσ(a) ≤ δ)
= va(σ(a), qσ(a)) (by definition of q)
On the other hand, if (a, r) /∈ F , then we have va(r, pr) < va(pi(a), ppi(a)) = va(σ(a), pσ(a)) (recall that
(a, σ(a)) ∈ F ). Therefore, for a small enough δ > 0 the following inequality holds va(r, pr) + drλar ≤
va(σ(a), pσ(a)) + dσ(a)λ
a
σ(a).
17 Since the utility functions are piecewise linear, we get va(r, pr − dr) ≤
va(σ(a), pσ(a) − dσ(a)). The definition of q gives us the desired inequality
va(r, qr) ≤ va(σ(a), qσ(a))
Overall, we get that (σ, q) is an EF solution wherein σ is a maximum weight perfect matching in
Fw(p) and q is componentwise less than the given price vector p. This completes the proof.
C Counterexamples
This section provides examples to show that both continuity and boundedness are necessary assump-
tions on the utility functions to guarantee the existence of an envy-free solution.
Unbounded utility functions: Consider a rent-division instance I with two agents that have identical
utilities for each of the two rooms {r1, r2}. In particular, for a ∈ {1, 2}, let va(r1, x) := e−x + 2 and
va(r2, x) := −ex + 2. Therefore, for all a and r, va(r, ·) is continuous and monotone decreasing, but also
unbounded. Specifically, for any price vector p ∈ R2, we have va(r1, p1) 6= va(r2, p2).
Note that in a rent-division instance wherein the utilities of agents are identical, a price vector p
induces an envy-free solution if and only if under p the utilities of the agents are equal for all the rooms.
Therefore, this instance does not admit an envy-free solution.
Discontinuous utility functions: Consider a rent-division instance I with two agents that have iden-
tical utilities for each of the two rooms {r1, r2}. Specifically, the utility function va(r1, ·) is a union
of monotone decreasing, linear functions in the 1/10-neighborhood of even integers and the utility
function va(r2, ·) is a union of monotone decreasing, linear functions in the 1/10-neighborhood of odd
integers; see Figure 5. Therefore, for all a and r, va(r, ·) is monotone decreasing and bounded, but also
discontinuous. By construction, we have va(r1, p1) 6= va(r2, p2) at any price vector p ∈ R2.
17Here, dr, dσ(a) ≤ δ. Also, note that even if (a, r) /∈ F , the magnitude of the slope λar (of the utility function va(r, ·)) is
well-defined and fixed though the linear domain (L,U).
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Note that in a rent-division instance in which the utilities of agents are identical, a price vector p
induces an envy-free solution if and only if under p the utilities of the agents are same for all the rooms.
Therefore, this instance does not admit an envy-free solution.
Prices
Utility
1
2
3
4
5
6
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
−1
−2
−3
va(r1, ·)
va(r2, ·)
Figure 5: Envy-free solutions might not exist under discontinuous utility functions
D Example from Figure 1
This section details an example which highlights that the set of prices that induce EF-solutions can be
nonconvex, though this set consists of a chain of polytopes which successively intersect; see Figure 1.
The rent division instance consists of three agents with the following linear utilities for the three
rooms; here, the rows of the 3× 3 matrix given below correspond to the agents and the columns corre-
spond to the rooms.  8− 8x 2− 1.5x 1− x1− x 8− 8x 2− 1.5x
2− 1.5x 1− x 8− 8x

For this instance, the envy-free polytopes associated with the allocations σ1 = (3, 1, 2), σ2 = (2, 3, 1) and
σ3 = (1, 2, 3) are nonempty. Note that Algorithm 1, when executed on this instance, will consider these
three permutations in order. In addition, as stated in Lemma 4, we have w(σ1) < w(σ2) < w(σ3).
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